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Abstract
This paper investigates the relationship between trade openness and the size of
governments, both theoretically and empirically. We argue that openness can increase
the size of governments through two channels: (1) a terms of trade externality, whereby
trade lowers the domestic cost of taxation, and (2) the demand for insurance, whereby
trade raises risk and public transfers. We provide a unied framework for studying
and testing these two mechanisms. Our main theoretical prediction is that the relative
strength of the two explanations depends on a key parameter, namely, the elasticity of
substitution between domestic and foreign goods. Moreover, while the rst mechanism
is ine¢ cient from the standpoint of world welfare, the second is instead optimal. In
the empirical part of the paper, we provide new evidence on the positive association
between openness and government size and we explore its determinants. Consistently
with the terms of trade externality channel, we show that the correlation is contingent
on a low elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods. Our ndings
raise warnings that globalization may have led to ine¢ ciently large governments.
JEL Classi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1 Introduction
The link between globalization and the size of governments is a major issue, yet not a
fully understood one. According to some authors, integration of markets should reduce
the e¤ectiveness of domestic policies and put competitive pressure to reduce government
activism. Since a large public sector may cause a loss of international competitiveness
(e.g., Alesina and Perotti, 1997), it may lower the demand for exports and employment,
and favor the outow of mobile factors (e.g., Gordon, 1983, Wilson, 1987, Persson and
Tabellini, 1992). This suggests that more economic integration will tend to reduce tax
rates, possibly leading to smaller governments and a downsizing of the welfare state. Yet,
the empirical evidence shows that openness to trade is associated with larger governments.
This pattern was rst unveiled by Cameron (1978) for 18 OECD countries and extended
to a much broader sample in a seminal paper by Rodirk (1998).1 The positive association
is not limited to the cross section. On average, international trade and public sectors have
grown together and a majority of countries that opened their markets have experienced
signicant increases in public expenditure.
This stylized fact is often viewed as puzzling. The main explanation put forward in
the literature is due to Rodrik (1997, 1998), who argues that public spending may provide
insurance in economies subject to the risk of international markets. If exposure to risk
grows with trade openness, so does the demand for public insurance.2 According to this
view, the growth of governments in the era of globalization should be welcome as the
optimal response to the intrinsic riskiness of open markets.
In this paper, we suggest an alternative and less optimistic explanation. Building on
insights from models of non-cooperative scal policy in open economies, we argue that
trading countries tend to have larger governments because they benet from a terms
of trade externality that shifts part of the cost of taxation abroad. Since governments
behaving non-cooperatively do not internalize the cost of taxation that trade imposes
onto foreigners, they react to market integration by increasing public spending.3
1Other studies investigating specically the correlation between openness and government size include
the UN-World Public Sector Report (2001), Garrett (2001), Islam (2004) and Garen and Trask (2005).
Some authors are skeptical about the robustness of this empirical regularity. Notably, Alesina and Wacziarg
(1998) argue that it may be spuriously driven by country size, because small countries tend to have large
public sectors and be very open. While their point is certainly important, our empirical results in Section
3 suggest that the correlation between government size and openness is robust to the inclusion of country
size.
2There are di¤erent channels through which globalization may increase risk. Rodrik (1997) emphasizes
that globalization may raise the elasticity of demand for labor, thereby exacerbating the e¤ect on wages
of domestic productivity shocks. Rodrik (1998) argues instead that open countries are more exposed to
the terms of trade variability induced by external shocks.
3See Persson and Tabellini (1995) for a survey of the literature on scal policy in open economies.
In particular, van der Ploeg (1987), Turnovsky (1988), Devereux (1991), Andersen et al. (1996) have
2
Our main purpose is to compare and test these two mechanisms. To this end, we
build a stylized model in which both forces are at work. In particular, we study a world
economy where benevolent governments set labor taxes unilaterally to nance country-
specic public goods and provide insurance against productivity shocks through transfers.
We then show how the size of governments depends on the degree of trade openness and
key parameters.
First, in a world of open countries, an expansion of the public sector crowds out
exports and leads to a terms of trade improvement that spreads the cost of taxation
beyond national borders. This happens irrespective of countries being large or small,
provided that they produce goods that are not perfect substitutes.4 In particular, the
domestic cost of taxation is lower the higher the trade share and the lower the elasticity of
substitution between import and export. The intuition for this result is that tax revenue
is spent on domestically produced public goods while a fraction of private income is spent
on foreign products. It follows that a shift in the composition of local expenditure from
the private to public sector raises the relative demand for domestic labor, the more so the
higher the share of imports in private consumption. Yet, for this change in local demand
to a¤ect domestic prices and wages, the elasticity of substitution between goods produced
in di¤erent countries has to be less then innite, or else prices and wages would be entirely
determined on world markets. This induced terms of trade improvement is what makes
taxation and public spending less costly in open countries producing di¤erentiated goods.5
Second, in a world with uncertainty arising from idiosyncratic productivity shocks, the
government can use transfers to act as a provider of insurance. In the spirit of Newbery and
Stiglitz (1984) and Rodrik (1997), we show that the demand for public insurance and the
equilibrium size of transfers may rise with trade openness. The reason is that in a closed
shown that public expenditure shifting demand in favor of domestic goods may bring about a terms of
trade improvement leading to overspending. More recently, Corsetti and Pesenti (2001) and Galí and
Monacelli (2005) have built important models of international transmission of monetary and scal policies
in the presence of such terms of trade e¤ects. Yet, all these papers are focused on issues other than the
relationship between the size of government and the volume of trade. Most surprisingly, terms of trade
externalities have never been used to explain the empirical association between openness and the size of
government, nor have they been compared to other possible explanations. The purpose of this paper is
precisely to ll this gap.
4For example, mobile phones by Nokia are not perceived as identical to those by Motorola, so that
a country as small as Finland does not have to take the export price as given. If the price of a Nokia
phone partially reects the high domestic taxes, every unit sold to foreigners provides a subsidy to the
Finnish welfare state. Even exporters of commodities need not be price takers: for example, Madagascar,
an exporter of vanilla, has market power because Malagasy vanilla is considered of higher quality than
that from other countries.
5 It is important to note that this mechanism, while related to the optimal tari¤ argument, is concep-
tually di¤erent from it. In setting an optimal tari¤, the government tries to increase the terms of trade up
to the level that maximizes domestic revenues, just like a monopolist. In the case we study, instead, the
government set taxes to nance public consumption and the induced terms of trade improvement always
reduces the cost of public spending, irrespective of the level of domestic and foreign prices.
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economy changes in relative prices across sectors provide insurance against productivity
shocks, as prices rise when output falls. International competition with producers of close
substitutes poses instead a limit to price variability thereby reducing the stabilizing role
of prices and increasing the expenditure for transfers. Thus, more openness exposes an
economy to higher income risk the larger the elasticity of substitution between imports
and exports. Comparing this result with the previous one, we learn that terms of trade
movements, and thus the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign products,
have contrasting e¤ects on the link between globalization and the size of government: on
the one hand, they introduce an externality that leads to higher taxation, on the other,
they tend to stabilize income in international markets, thus lowering the demand for public
insurance in sectors exposed to foreign competition.
The two explanations di¤er fundamentally in their welfare properties. While the ex-
pansion of the public sector for insurance motives can be the optimal reaction to higher
risk, the terms of trade externality leads to excessively large governments, as policy mak-
ers do not fully internalize the cost of taxation. In the latter case, when all governments
raise spending in response to more trade openness, the result is overprovision of public
goods and no change in the terms of trade for any country, as policies just o¤set each
other.6 Taking this e¤ect into account, we show that the net impact of an increase in
trade on world welfare may even become negative, because the gains from trade may fail
to compensate the ine¢ ciency arising from excessive public spending.
The opposite welfare implications of the two mechanisms make it particularly impor-
tant to assess their empirical relevance. This is the goal of the second part of the paper.
To set the stage, we show new evidence on the positive association between openness and
government size. Using a large dataset comprising up to 143 countries observed over half
a century (1950-2000), we document two important empirical facts. First, that the corre-
lation between openness and government size holds strong both across countries and over
time. Second, that there is no evidence of a positive association between openness and
government transfers for social security and welfare.
Then, we explore the role played by the elasticity of substitution between import and
export in the relationship between openness and governments. Identifying this elasticity
is a hard task and we therefore rely on two di¤erent strategies. The rst aims at provid-
ing proxies of this elasticity for individual countries building on the idea that countries
exporting di¤erentiated goods should face a lower average export demand elasticity. In
particular, using data on the structure of commodity trade, we compute two country-level
6Strictly speaking, this is true in a symmetric equilibrium. When countries are asymmetric, di¤erent
domestic policies will dampen each other, but the terms of trade will generally move.
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measures of export di¤erentiation: one builds on Rauch (1999)s classication of traded
commodities into di¤erentiated and homogeneous products, the other on Broda and Wein-
stein (2006)s estimates of the elasticity of substitution across sectors. We then use these
measures of export di¤erentiation as inverse proxies for the elasticity of substitution and
interact them with openness to see how they a¤ect the relationship between openness and
governments. The introduction of the new terms in the estimation equation yields strik-
ing results that are robust across specications and to the inclusion of controls: openness
and government size are positively correlated only for countries exporting di¤erentiated
products, precisely as implied by the terms of trade motive.
Our second strategy builds on Acemoglu and Ventura (2002) and allows to recover
direct estimates of the terms of trade externality across groups of countries. We start
by showing that countries growing faster than average experience a deterioration of their
terms of trade, this suggesting that countries are not, on average, price takers. In particu-
lar, our estimates are consistent with an average elasticity of substitution between import
and export lower than 3. We also show that, as in our model, government expenditure
crowds out private production, which in turn leads to a terms of trade improvement, and
that public expenditure has no direct e¤ect on the terms of trade. More importantly, we
show that the terms of trade externality is much bigger (implying an elasticity of substi-
tution around 1.5) for the group of countries exhibiting a relatively stronger correlation
between openness and government size.
The nding that terms of trade considerations are a driving force behind the growth
of the public sector may appear surprising at rst. Nevertheless, it becomes much more
plausible once we recognize that the logic behind it is the widespread Keynesian view
that public expenditure can be used to sustain demand for domestic products and labor.
Crucial for this is the assumption that public expenditure is home-biased. On this respect,
the evidence leaves no doubts. For example, in a sample of 14 (developed and developing)
countries with available data, the average import share in government consumption is
a slim 1%, while the economy-wide import share is around 47% (see the Appendix for
more details on these numbers). It follows naturally that the demand switching e¤ect
of public spending is stronger the higher the degree of openness of the private sector
and that big changes in openness can a¤ect substantially government incentives to boost
employment through scal policy.7 In fact, our model suggests the e¤ect of openness on
7A recent example of this logic is the following statement, made by a PIMCO spokesman, on how to
give a stimulus to the US economy: Consumers will just buy more Chinese goods with stimulus package
money, more of the same. What is needed is public investment to ll demand void of private sector. This
is the mechanism we stress in action: as the import share increases, sustaining demand via public spending
is preferred to a tax cut. A government not using expansionary public spending would instead su¤er an
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public spending to be quantitatively large: reasonable calibrations show that the observed
increase of average openness between 1950 and 2000 (42.5 percentage points) can explain
between 16% to 45% of the overall average increase in public spending during the same
period (from 10.2% of GDP to 22%).
Finally, this paper is part of a growing literature demonstrating the empirical rele-
vance of terms of trade considerations in many contexts. For example, terms of trade
movements create sizeable growth externalities across countries (e.g., Acemoglu Ventura,
2002, Vilarrubia, 2006); they lead to incomplete pass-through of exchange rate shocks
(see Goldberg and Knetter, 1997, for a survey) and of tari¤s (e.g., Feenstra, 2004, pp.
235-240); they a¤ect the structure of protection across goods and countries (Limao, 2006,
and Broda, Limao and Weinstein, 2006); they are a signicant factor in trade negotiations
(Bagwell and Staiger, 2006); they appear to be an indispensable ingredient in explaining
co-movements in new open-economy business cycle models, where the assumption of a
low elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods is becoming the norm.
Within this vast literature, particularly interesting for our purpose is the empirical nding
in Monacelli and Perotti (2008) that a rise in government spending generates a signicant
appreciation of the terms of trade.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 illustrates the model, Section 3 brings it
to the data, and Section 4 concludes.
2 A Simple Model of Trade and Governments
We construct a simple static model of a world economy with a large number N of identical
countries and a continuum [0; 1] of industries. Each industry produces di¤erentiated goods
and countries are specialized in di¤erent varieties. Consumers enjoy utility from the
consumption of di¤erentiated goods and a country-specic public good. Governments
of each country have two functions: to produce public goods (e.g., education, defense,
civil infrastructures) nanced through taxation and to provide public insurance against
idiosyncratic shocks (e.g., social security and welfare) through transfers. Governments
set policies unilaterally so as to maximize utility of domestic citizens. Trade takes place
because consumers like variety. However, we consider a situation of imperfect market
integration where trade may not be allowed in all industries. We then use the model to
explore how the degree of trade openness can a¤ect the expenditure on public goods and
transfers.8
adverse movement in relative wages and be forced to implement policies in support of demand.
8We purposefully distinguish between the two functions of the government, as a provider of insurance
and public goods, to preserve the highest transparency in studying the determinants of each component
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2.1 The World Economy
Consumers in all countries are risk-averse and share the same preferences represented by
the following expected utility function:
EU = E
C1 
1  ;  > 0; (1)
where E is the expectation operator,  is the coe¢ cient of relative risk-aversion and
C =

exp
Z 1
0
log Yjdj

G1 ;  2 (0; 1) ; (2)
where Yj is the subutility derived from consumption of di¤erentiated goods produced in
sector j 2 [0; 1] and G is the consumption of a country-specic public good. The parameter
 captures consumer preferences for private versus public goods.
The world we describe contains a large number of small countries, indexed by i 2
f1; :::; Ng, each specialized in the production of a single variety i in every sector j.9 Full
specialization follows from the Armington assumption that goods are di¤erentiated by the
country of origin.10 Preferences for di¤erentiated goods in each sector j are represented
by a CES subutility function:
Yj = N
+1
 
1
N
X
i2N
y
 1

j;i
! 
 1
;  > 1;   0; (3)
where yj;i is consumption of the variety produced by country i in sector j and  > 1 is
the elasticity of substitution between varieties produced in di¤erent countries.11 Equa-
tion (3) is a generalization, introduced by Benassy (1998), of well-known Dixit-Stiglitz
preferences. Its special property is that the term N 1=( 1) allows us to disentangle the
elasticity of substitution between product varieties from the preference for variety. From
(3), greater variety is associated with higher utility whenever  > 0. To see this, suppose
each (identical) country produces the same amount y, so that consumption of a variety in
any given country is y=N . Then, the sub-utility Yj becomes Ny, which is increasing in N
of public expenditure. In reality, of course, such a distinction would be more blurred.
9The assumption that countries are small makes the game played by governments non-strategic, in
the sense that governments do not react to any change of policy in any (small) foreign countries. This
assumption is for convenience and is not essential for the results.
10The fact that specialization is here assumed is just a simplication as it would be possible to derive it
as the equilibrium outcome of more general models.
11The assumption  > 1 rules out immiserizing growth. For the main results, a milder restriction is
su¢ cient. With a slight abuse of notation, we refer to yj;i as both consumption and production of a given
variety. In aggregate, of course, the two will be identical. In the text, we always specify whether we mean
consumption or production.
7
if  > 0. The standard Dixit-Stiglitz preferences are a special case of (3) for  = (   1) 1.
We follow the more general formulation because distinguishing between the elasticity of
substitution and the preference for variety can be important for welfare analysis.12
We model imperfect economic integration between countries by assuming that in some
sectors goods can be freely traded in international markets, while in others trade costs
are prohibitive. Accordingly, the unit measure of sectors is partitioned into two subsets
of traded and nontraded industries. Sectors are ordered such that those with an index
j   2 [0; 1] are subject to negligible trade costs and the others, with an index j >  ,
face prohibitive trade costs. We refer to globalizationas an increase in the measure 
of traded goods, i.e., the fall in trade costs (from prohibitive to zero) in some sectors.13
An important advantage of this approach is that it o¤ers a very natural measure of trade
openness with a simple empirical counterpart. In particular, note that the utility function
(2) implies that expenditure is divided evenly across sectors. Together with the assumption
that each country is small and thus exports its entire domestic production of the traded
goods, this implies that  is the share of imports (or exports, given balanced trade) in
private spending.
In any traded sector (j  ), maximization of (3) subject to a budget constraint yields
CES demand functions with a price-elasticity of :
pj;i
Qj
= N (+1)=

Yj
yj;i
1=
; (4)
where
Qj  N 
 
1
N
X
i2N
p1 j;i
! 1
1 
(5)
can be interpreted as the ideal price index in sector j, i.e., the minimum cost of one unit
of Yj . Given that each country exports all its production and imports all its consumption
of traded goods,14 equation (4) gives the terms of trade of country i in sector j: the price
of export relative to the price of the imported basket. Note that a fall (rise) of domestic
production improves (worsens) the countrys terms of trade. This happens despite each
country being small, because countries are specialized in the production of goods that
12None of our main results requires  6= (   1) 1 :
13Although this is a stylized description of reality, it accords well with the observation that there are
areas of economic activity where the degree of market integration is low. There is also growing evidence
that trade between countries has increased more along the extensive margin (more goods are traded today
than in the past) than along the intensive margin (higher volumes of trade in the same goods). As shown,
for instance, by Broda and Weinstein (2006), the number of product varieties imported by the US over
the last three decades has increased by a factor of four.
14This is true as N goes to innity. It is taken as an approximation when the number of countries is
large.
8
are imperfect substitutes. In any nontraded sectors (j > ), instead, each country i only
consumes its own domestic output, yj;i.
2.2 Country Equilibrium
Consider now a single country. For simplicity, we focus on a symmetric case in which all
countries share the same parameters. We remove the index i with the understanding that,
unless otherwise stated, all variables now refer to a single country. Labor is the only factor
of production and is employed by competitive rms to produce both private and public
goods. Labor productivity in any sector j is assumed to be the realization of a random
variable  that takes value  = 1 +  (with 0   < 1) in good states and  = 1    in
bad states. Good and bad states are equally likely and each industry j in each country i
is subject to independent realizations of . That is, shocks are uncorrelated across sectors
and countries.15 Moreover, we assume that workers must choose the sector of employment
before the realization of the productivity shock and cannot move everafter. We take this
as a fair representation of a short-run equilibrium in which labor mobility is not perfect.
If the economy repeats itself and shocks are uncorrelated over time, this equilibrium will
also prevail in the long-run, provided that frictions to labor mobility prevent workers
from exploiting short-run gains from positive temporary shocks.16 Given that markets are
competitive, workers are paid the value of their marginal product:
wj = pjj : (6)
Under complete markets, workers would be able to insure the idiosyncratic productivity
shock. However, in the following we rule out private insurance markets, or else there would
be no role for public insurance, but we allow the government to stabilize income by way
of transfers. Since workers are risk-averse, providing full insurance is the optimal strategy
for a benevolent government that seeks to maximize utility of its citizens. We assume that
government transfers are such that all workers in sector j have an ex-post income equal
to the expected wage in the sector, E (wj). Anticipating this, workers allocate themselves
across sectors so as to maximize the expected wage, as if they where risk-neutral. Given
that sectors are ex-ante identical and that expenditure is equally allocated between them,
15We assume that the number of countries N is large enough so that the law of large numbers applies.
This means that there is no aggregate uncertainty.
16Labor mobility across sectors may be limited, for example, by sector-specic human capital and labor
market frictions. If the labor immobility assumption is relaxed, then workers would not be exposed to
any income risk. This would break the demand for insurance mechanism, though not the terms of trade
argument. Yet, risk and insurance motives would be restored as long as there is any sector-specic factor,
as for example in Grossman and Helpman (1994).
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workers spread evenly across sectors and all have the same ex-post income w.
In the public sector, we assume that one unit of labor can be employed to produce one
unit of the public good, G. The public sector is not subject to uncertainty, because it is
intended as a large set of activities over which idiosyncratic shocks are averaged out.17 To
nance public production, the government sets a tax g on labor income, so that the total
tax revenue is gwL, where L is the country labor force and w the average wage rate.18
Without uncertainty, the public sector has to pay the average wage and thus provision of
the public good can be found as:
G = gL; (7)
which is also employment in the public sector. Given that gwL is total spending on public
goods while wL is the countrys GDP, g is also the share of government production in
GDP.
Imposing labor market clearing,
R 1
0 Ljdj + gL = L, and recalling that Lj is constant
across sectors, we can solve for employment and production in any sector j 2 [0; 1]:
Lj = (1  g)L; (8)
yj = j (1  g)L: (9)
To study the decision problem faced by the government, we rst need to solve for the
utility of the representative agent at a given level of taxation. As a preliminary step, it
will prove useful to dene consumption of any single nontraded good and traded basket
in a world without uncertainty (i.e., for  = 0). In this case, country consumption of
nontraded goods is equalized across industries and given by:
Yn  (1  g)L: (10)
Note that an increase in government production g lowers Yn one to one because it shifts
labor out of the private sector. Consumption of any traded basket Yj can instead be found
dividing the expenditure allocated to a sector, wL (1  g), by the ideal price index:
Y  wL (1  g)
Q
= [(1  g)L] 1 N (+1)= (Yw)
1
 ; (11)
17See also Galí (1994) and Fátas and Mihov (2001) on this point. They nd evidence of a robust negative
correlation between various measures of government size and per capita GDP volatility in OECD countries.
18The form of taxation is not crucial for the results, because the key assumption is not on how the
government raises tax revenues, but rather on how these are spent. When taxes are spent on domestically
produced public goods, an increase in taxation shifts demand towards domestic goods and thus raises
wages. Distortionary taxation would reinforce the result, as open countries do not fully internalize the
distortion they impose on the world economy.
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where we have used (6), (9), (4) and Yw is world consumption of any traded basket
when  = 0. Equation (11) shows that an increase in government production g does
not reduce traded consumption, Y , one to one as long as it brings about a terms of
trade improvement: by means of (4), the fall in domestic production L (1  g) is partially
compensated by a rise in p=Q so that income falls less than proportionally in traded
sectors.
Finally, aggregating over industries and following the conventional assumption that
the public good is non-rival, the utility function (2) of the representative agent in the
presence of uncertainty reduces to:
C =
"
(
nYn)
1  (
Y )
L
#
G1 ; (12)
where the terms 
n 
 
1  21=2  1 and 
  h12 (1 + ) 1 + 12 (1  ) 1 i  1  1
quantify the utility cost of uctuations in consumption across sectors due to productivity
shocks and are inverse measures of consumption risk, for a given income.19 Note that

n = 
 = 1 in case of no uncertainty (i.e., for  = 0), while both 
n and 
 are decreasing
in . That is, utility falls with the variance of shocks (2) because consumers would like
to smooth consumption across sectors. Moreover, 
n  
 because in traded industries
the fall in consumption of varieties hit by negative shocks is partially compensated by the
rise in consumption of varieties subject to positive shocks, the more so the higher is the
degree of substitutability across varieties.
2.3 Openness and Public Goods
Government spending on public goods (g) is chosen in each country so as to maximize the
utility of its representative citizen, taking world prices, Q, and production, Yw, as given.
Substituting (7), (10) and (11) into (12), and noting that U (1) is an increasing function
of C (12), the objective function of the government becomes:
Max
g
C = (1  g)(1 =) (
n)(1 )
"

N
 (+1)=

Yw
L
1=#
(gL)1  ; (13)
19To nd (12), note that consumption of a nontraded good is jLj while consumption of a traded basket
is
 R 
0
wzLzdz

= (Qj), where wz = Qz (z)
 1
 N 
+1
 (Yz=Lz)
1
 . Noting that Qz = Qj ; 8z; j 2 [0;  ]
and Yz = 
Yw; 8z 2 [0;  ], and substituting into (2) yields (12), once denitions (10) and (11) are used.
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which leads to the rst order condition:20

1  g

1  


=
1  
g
: (14)
The left hand side of (14) is the marginal cost of taxation. It can be interpreted as the
marginal utility of private consumption multiplied by the fall in private consumption due
to an increase in taxation. The volume of trade,  , lowers the cost of taxation because,
as just seen, income in traded sectors falls less than proportionally with g. The right
hand side is instead the marginal value of public production, which is proportional to the
preference for the public good, 1  , and declines with g because of decreasing marginal
utility. Solving (14) yields:
g =
1  
1  = : (15)
Not surprisingly, it is easy to see that g is higher the stronger the preference for the public
good, (1  ).21 More interestingly, so long as  is nite, the size of the public sector
grows with openness. By now, the intuition for this result should be clear and can be
summarized saying that trade lowers the domestic cost of taxation because of a terms of
trade externality. Clearly, this depends on the possibility for a country to a¤ect its terms
of trade, as can be seen from the sign of the cross derivative:
@2g
@@
< 0:
Thus, the e¤ect of trade on the public sector is stronger the lower the elasticity of substi-
tution between goods, because a lower elasticity of substitution implies that prices (the
terms of trade) react more. Moreover, (15) implies that g increases when  falls as long
as there is some trade,  > 0. That is, more product di¤erentiation increases the size of
the public sector in open economy.22
How large is the e¤ect of changes in  on g? Is it of the same order of magnitude as
the empirical correlation between openness and government size? By choosing parameter
values, we can use equation (15) to answer these questions. In so doing, however, we rst
need to recognize the di¤erence between  and the openness measure typically used in the
empirical literature. Recall that  is the import (or export) share in private spending.
20 >  guarantees that the second order condition is satised.
21This is guaranteed as long as  >  , also implying g < 1.
22Per capita government spending is instead independent of country size, L. This is a special implication
of Cobb-Douglas preferences, as discussed in Alesina and Wacziarg (1998). It is also worth noting that
if labor supply L was endogenous, the terms of trade externality could help explain why governments of
more open European countries are more willing to restrict working hours compared to the US. We are
grateful to Philippe Martin for suggesting this.
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The most common openness measure, that we label O, is instead dened as import plus
export over total GDP. The two measures are linked by the following relationship:  =
O= [2 (1  g)]. Substituting this into (15) and deriving with respect to O yields:
@g
@O
=
g (1  g)
2 (1  g)2   O : (16)
Provided that O is not excessively large, this derivative is positive and decreasing in .23
The crucial parameter to quantify @g=@O is the elasticity of substitution between varieties,
for which we take two benchmark values:  = 1:5 and  = 3. This interval is consistent
with our own estimates reported in Section 3, as well as those found in other studies,
such as Acemoglu and Ventura (2002) and Broda and Weinstein (2006). Next, we set
O = 0:86, equal to the cross-country average over the period 1995-2000, and choose  so
as to match the average government size of 0:21 in (15). This delivers  = 0:85 for  = 1:5
and  = 0:82 for  = 3. Under this parametrization, the derivative @g=@O varies from
0:044 to 0:123, an interval that is remarkably close to the empirical estimates reported in
Section 3, ranging from 0:054 to 0:15.
2.3.1 Robustness
Although our model is special in many respects, the result that open countries do not
fully internalize the cost of domestic taxation is a fairly general one. In fact, it does not
depend on many of the simplifying assumptions we used. First, as shown in the Appendix,
equation (15) can be generalized by removing the symmetry imposed across countries.
This is important because, in reality, countries have di¤erent preferences for private versus
public goods, di¤erent degrees of trade openness, and export goods with widely di¤erent
characteristics. Introducing asymmetries in all the key parameters will allow us to fully
exploit the cross-country variation in the data when testing equation (15) in section 3.
Second, the result is robust to alternative descriptions of the globalization process.
Although introducing trade barriers of a di¤erent nature may require modifying some
aspects of our model, it is unlikely to a¤ect the main result. The reason is that, irrespective
of the nature of trade barriers, the value of a terms of trade improvement is necessarily
proportional to the volume of trade. Thus, the rise in domestic prices following an increase
in taxation is more benecial for countries relatively more open to trade.24
23More precisely, @g=@O is positive under the mild restriction  < 
 
1 p1   =.
24The feature of our model that the entire domestic production in traded sectors is exported is not
crucial. Clearly, a home bias in private consumption at the sector level would tend to weaken the terms
of trade externality. Nevertheless, the value of terms of trade improvements would still be proportional to
the volume of trade, precisely as in the model.
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Third, the result is reminiscent of the optimal tari¤ argument, whereby a small import
tari¤ or export tax can be welfare enhancing when they bring about a terms of trade
improvement. Indeed, our model builds on the same assumption that domestic policies
can a¤ect the terms of trade and suggests that even the most basic form of taxation is
likely to have such terms of trade e¤ects. However, our result is more general than the
optimal tari¤ argument. In fact, while trade policy is by now restricted in most countries
by international trade agreements, income taxes are still viewed as an issue of national
sovereignty. More important, our result is independent from the optimal tari¤ argument:
as shown in the Appendix, equation (15) holds una¤ected even when the government is
optimally setting an export tax or an import tari¤. It follows as a corollary that our
analysis remains valid if rms have market power, not just countries.
Fourth, the Armington assumption according to which varieties are di¤erentiated by
the country of origin simplies the analysis enormously, by making the pattern of special-
ization exogenous. Yet, it is not strictly required for the result to hold: the only crucial
assumption is that countries be able to a¤ect their terms of trade. This possibility is
captured in a parsimonious way by the parameter  in our model. Whether the case of
a nite  (for some or all countries) is realistic or not is an empirical question that we
address later in the paper. We also want to stress that the terms of trade externality is a
general feature of most trade models, and not a specic property of our approach.
Fifth, the assumption of no international labor mobility can be relaxed without over-
turning the result. On the contrary, we show in the Appendix that labor mobility may
even reinforce it. The intuition is as follows. If workers migrate in response to an increase
in domestic taxes, this may put a downward pressure on the size of government, as in
the literature on tax competition. At the same time, however, the terms of trade now
improve more after a rise in g: not only because labor is shifted out of the private sector
producing tradeables, but also because the domestic labor force falls. For this reason, the
link between g and  may actually become stronger.25 Frictions to labor mobility across
sectors are also immaterial for the terms of trade argument.
Finally, an important limit of our analysis is the lack of politico-economic aspects, in
that g is simply chosen by a benevolent government, while in reality the interests of policy
makers may not coincide with those of citizens.26 In general, the incentive to increase
taxation as trade expands would hold so long as maximizing domestic income is among
25Capital mobility can also make an increase in taxation more costly, due to capital outows, and thus
reduce the size of government. In any event, the e¤ect of international factor mobility is conceptually
di¤erent from that of trade openness, which is the focus of the paper, because it does not depend on trade
in goods, but rather on other aspects of globalization.
26See Persson and Tabellini (2000) for an extensive treatment of political economics.
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the objectives of politicians. This is often the case in probabilistic voting models (such as
Lindbeck and Weibull, 1993) as well as lobbying models (such as Grossman and Helpman,
1994) and may be true in non-democratic political systems too. If part of the tax revenue
is used in a socially wasteful way to the private benet of those who are in power, the
terms of trade externality could lower the perceived domestic social cost of this misuse of
public resources. Trade can thus promote ine¢ cient policies, for politicians may not fully
internalize their costs. Adding di¤erent types of agents (e.g., workers and capital owners)
with conicting interests and a voting mechanism to determine the policy outcome goes
beyond the scope of this paper and is left for future work.27
2.4 Openness and Public Insurance
We now consider the other component of the size of government, the amount of redis-
tribution through transfers required to insurance workers from idiosyncratic productivity
shocks, and study how it varies with openness. In this setting, openness a¤ects aggregate
demand for insurance because risk is borne by workers in traded and nontraded sectors in
a very di¤erent way. To see this, note that price movements tend to o¤set uctuations in
productivity: prices rise whenever output falls and thus low productivity in bad times is
partially compensated. Given our assumptions, compensation is full in nontraded sectors
because demand for nontraded goods has a unitary price elasticity so that no transfer is
needed to stabilize income. This can be seen by computing the equilibrium wage o¤ered
in a nontraded sector after the realization of the productivity shock:
wj =
w(1  g)L
Lj
= w; j > ;
where w is the average wage and w(1 g)L is after-tax income allocated to the consumption
of good j. The latter equality follows from (8). As the model has no aggregate uncertainty,
the variance of wages in nontraded industries is zero.
This is not the case in the traded sectors where there is foreign competition. While the
share of world income allocated to a given traded sector is constant due to Cobb-Douglas
preferences, its distribution across countries depends on productivity because the elasticity
of substitution vis-a-vis foreign varieties, , is higher than one, so that the relative price
of domestic varieties does not react enough to provide full insurance. Using (9) and (4),
27Another interesting set of issues would arise if the short-run elasticity of substitution is lower than in
the long-run, e.g., because of habit formation in demand. The government could then increase taxes in
the short-run, but be forced to eventually reduce them in the long-run. Persistence in public expenditure
would generate additional interesting dynamics that cannot be analyzed in our simple static setup. See,
for example, Hassler et al. (2003) for a dynamic politico-economic theory of governments.
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equilibrium wage in a traded sector (before transfers), wj = pjyj=Lj , and its variance can
be found as:
wj = Qj (j)
 1
 N 
+1


Yj
Lj
 1

; j   ; (17)
V AR(logwj) =

1  1

2
V AR (log ) ; j   ;
where we have used the fact that, by the law of large numbers, V AR (Yj) = V AR (Qj) = 0.
Income in traded sectors uctuates more with productivity the higher is , as foreign
competition with producers of close substitutes removes the stabilizing role of prices.
Thus, our simple framework captures well the argument that trade, by exposing sectors
to foreign competition, makes the derived demand for labor more elastic, implying that
shocks to productivity result in much greater earnings volatility.28
To study the e¤ect of trade on the size of government through the demand for public
insurance, we dene public spending on insurance T as the total transfer needed to stabilize
wages as a share of private GDP. This can be computed as the expected transfer per sector
producing traded goods, integrated over the measure of traded sectors and divided by the
value of private production:
T =
Z 
0
jwj   wj
2w
dj: (18)
Using (17) and
R 1
 wjdj =

1 
R 
0 wjdj yields:
T =

2
 (=)
 1
   1
(=)
 1
 + 1
: (19)
Total transfers grow with trade openness,  , the elasticity  and the variance of produc-
tivity .29 As  ! 1 the need for insurance disappears and T ! 0. Thus, the lower
the elasticity of substitution between import and export, the lower the need for a risk-
mitigating role of the public sector in open countries.
2.4.1 Robustness
The case of idiosyncratic productivity shocks is both plausible and simple, and this is
why we focused on it. Yet, we would like to know what happens with shocks of di¤erent
types. We now argue that introducing aggregate (rather than idiosyncratic) uncertainty
28See Rodrik (1997), Chapter 2, for a more extensive discussion of this argument and some empirical
evidence. A similar point is made in Newbery and Stiglitz (1984).
29 It follows immediately that transfers over total GDP (as opposed to private GDP) are also a positive
function of the trade share in total GDP.
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and demand (rather than supply) shocks is unlikely to change the main conclusion of this
section: that the need for insurance falls as the elasticity of substitution between domestic
and foreign goods declines. To show this, we briey discuss how changing the type of
shock a¤ects the relationship between trade and risk.
First, assume that  is an aggregate, country-specic, productivity shock. That is, all
sectors in country i receive the same realization i. In autarky, a country would have no
mean to insure against such risk.30 For an open economy, terms of trade movements do
provide some insurance, as it is shown in (17). Rather than amplifying risk, in this case
trade dampens wage uctuations; however, just as we saw before, terms of trade changes
provide better insurance when  is low.
Consider now preference (demand) shocks across varieties produced in di¤erent coun-
tries. These are external shocks, like shifts in world demand in favor (or against) the
variety produced by a given sector in a country. Shocks of this sort can be introduced
directly into preferences for di¤erentiated varieties:
Yj = N
+1
"
1
N
X
i2N
(j;i) (yj;i)
 1

# 
 1
: (20)
Note that nontraded sectors are, by construction, insulated from these shocks. On the
contrary, deriving demand from (20) it can be shown that
V AR(logwj) = V AR (log ) ; j   :
With global shifts in the demand curve, the elasticity of substitution across varieties plays
no role in determining a countrys exposure to risk. If these shocks are uncorrelated across
sectors, workers can be fully insured through transfers. If instead all sectors in a country
are hit by the same demand shocks, then full insurance cannot be achieved.
Comparing these cases, we conclude that, regardless of the source of uncertainty, the
demand for insurance is (weakly) increasing in the elasticity of substitution between do-
mestic and foreign goods.31 Moreover, in a general situation where shocks of all kinds are
present, trade will increase risk provided that  is su¢ ciently high.
An alternative view could be that trade increases aggregate uncertainty by fostering
specialization, thereby making the economy more exposed to sectoral shocks. Although
this case is not explicitly contemplated in our model, we can think of it as a situation where
trade turns idiosyncratic shocks into aggregate shocks to private production (for example,
30Though it could reduce workers exposure to risk by expanding the safepublic sector.
31Cole and Obstfeld (1991) also support this view.
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by shutting down some sectors). Transfers would provide full insurance in autarky, but
not with trade, for aggregate uncertainty cannot be diversied. Openness could then lead
to an expansion of the safe public sector G, as a response to the higher risk exposure of
the economy. Even in this case, though, the e¤ect of shocks would be alleviated by price
variability so that the demand for insurance would increase more with trade when  is
high, just as above. It is also worth emphasizing that, in a world where lump sum transfers
are not available, policy makers could increase public employment to reduce the overall
exposure to risk, provided that the public sector is safer than the rest of the economy.32
2.5 Welfare
We now confront the solution to the government problem with the world optimum. Given
that redistribution is costless and substitutes for missing insurance markets, it is easy to
prove that the increase in transfers due to higher openness is globally e¢ cient. However,
the level of taxation chosen unilaterally is not, because governments do not consider the
cost of taxation that trade shifts onto foreigners. A world social planner, instead, would
internalize the cost of public spending for the world economy. To capture this in our
symmetric set up, it su¢ ces to modify the objective function of the government so as to
take into account that the equilibrium g will be identical across countries and will thus
a¤ect world output. Substituting Yw = N+1 (1  g)L into (13) and rearranging yields:
Max
g
C =
h
N (
n)
(1 ) (
 ) (1  g)
i
(gL)1  : (21)
From the rst order condition, it is easy to verify that world welfare is maximized when
each country sets the size of the public sector equal to:
g = 1  ; (22)
which is the level chosen in autarky. It follows immediately that, as market integration ()
increases, governments behaving non-cooperatively move further away from the globally
e¢ cient solution. The reason is that, in the presence of specialization and trade, rising
taxes is a beggar-thy-neighbor policy at the expenses of foreign countries and the incentive
to use such a policy is higher the larger the trade share.
When all countries set g uncooperatively, welfare may even decline with globalization
32 In our model, we make a sharp distinction between transfers and public employment in order to isolate
theoretically the insurance and the cost-shifting motives for increasing government size with openness. In
reality, public production is also used for insurance purposes. This channel is explicitly discussed in the
literature on the Scandinavian model, where openness is combined with a large welfare system. See, for
example, Andersen (2004, 2008).
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(an increase in ) because of the ine¢ cient equilibrium response of governments. The
reason is a prisoners dilemma type of problem: as  increases, each individual government
has an incentive to raise taxation, tough in a symmetric equilibrium no country benets
from any terms of trade improvement, as di¤erent policies just o¤set each others. Yet all
consumers loose due to the underprovision of private goods. Then, despite all countries
making the individually optimal decision, welfare may decline. In particular, an increase
in  may be welfare reducing if the ine¢ ciency from excessive public spending it induces
outweighs the gains from trade, given by the value of consuming foreign varieties. Thus,
welfare losses from globalization will be unlikely when the gains from trade are big, i.e.,
when there is a large number of countries N , a strong preference for variety  and a high
substitutability across varieties  so that consumption risk is lower in traded sectors (i.e.,

 > 
n). To see this, take equation (21) and note that, holding the tax rate constant,
utility is increasing in trade () whenever N > 1,  > 0 and/or 
 > 
n. Moreover,
given that public spending on public goods converges to the globally optimal level when
the elasticity of substitution increases, the ine¢ ciency from trade is lower when  is high.
Formally, substituting g from (15) into (21), the condition for trade to be welfare-improving
can be derived as:
 logN + log



n
>
1
     
1
    ; (23)
where the left hand side is the marginal benet from trade and the right hand side is
the marginal cost due to ine¢ cient public spending worldwide. Clearly, condition (23) is
more likely to be satised when N ,  and  are high. However, we can say more. When
 = 0, the right hand side of (23) becomes zero, so that welfare gains from small volumes
of trade are guaranteed as long as N > 1 and  > 0. The reason is that the distortion
is proportional to the trade share while the marginal benet of trade does not depend on
the level of international integration. Therefore, small volumes of trade bring about rst
order gains but only second order losses.
On the contrary, as  ! 1 the condition for welfare gains becomes:
 (   1) log N


n
>
1 + 
    ; (24)
which may be violated if  and  are low, even when N is large. This suggests that trade
must be benecial at rst, but may become welfare-reducing beyond a critical level. That
is, there may be an optimal level of international integration. This case is illustrated in
Figure 1, where the level of utility is plotted against the trade share  for two di¤erent
values of the gains from trade. Of course, if gains from trade are strong enough, they may
always dominate the ine¢ ciency from uncoordinated policies. It is also worth stressing
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Figure 1: Trade Openness and Welfare. The lines are drawn for  = 0:8;  = 1:5 and two
values for the gains from trade:  log (N
=
n) = 0:3 (solid line) and  log (N
=
n) =
0:2 (broken line).
that in this model the gains from trade would always be non-negative for a world planner
that fully internalizes the cost of taxation.
We close this section by summarizing the main implications of the model in the fol-
lowing Propositions.
Proposition 1 Openness can increase the size of governments through two channels: (1)
the terms of trade externality, whereby trade lowers the domestic cost of taxation, and
(2) the demand for insurance, whereby trade raises risk and public transfers. The rst
mechanism is ine¢ cient from the standpoint of world welfare, while the second is optimal.
Proposition 2 The strength of the terms of trade externality relative to the demand for
insurance is determined by the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods
. As  ! 1 the demand for insurance weakens, while the terms of trade externality
becomes stronger. As  ! 1 the terms of trade externality vanishes, while the demand
for insurance becomes stronger.
3 Openness, Government Size and the Terms of Trade: The Evidence
In this section, we look for evidence on the di¤erent mechanisms linking the size of gov-
ernment to openness. We start by showing that the positive correlation between openness
20
and government size is remarkably robust, that exposure to terms of trade risk cannot
explain variation in government size, and that openness does not increase transfers for so-
cial security and welfare. Next we show, using di¤erent approaches, that the link between
openness and government size is contingent on a low elasticity of substitution between
domestic and foreign goods. All these results support the explanation based on the terms
of trade externality.
3.1 Cross-Sectional Evidence
We start by showing the relationship between government size, openness and other de-
terminants in a cross-section of 143 countries. Our main measure of government size is
general government consumption expenditure (abbreviated as government consumption)
as a share of GDP, drawn from the Penn World Tables (release 6.1, PWT henceforth).
This variable is a fairly good proxy for general government production, g, in our theo-
retical model.33 Our measure of openness is instead the share of imports plus exports
over GDP, again from the PWT, and is consistent with both our model and the previous
literature.34
Table 1 reports the rst set of results. All variables except shares are in logs and
are computed as averages for the years 1995-00. Following the previous literature, the
openness ratio is lagged 5 years (it is the average for the period 1990-1994) and outlier
countries with a trade share greater than 200 per cent are excluded from the sample. In
column (1), we report a simple univariate regression of government consumption on the
openness ratio, whose coe¢ cient is large and signicant beyond the one percent level. In
column (2), we add per capita income and population (from the PWT). Income controls
for the fact that the level of development may a¤ect the availability of tax bases (the
so-called Wagners law) and the preference for public goods (1    in our model). We
control for population to take instead account of Alesina and Wacziarg (1988)s concern
that the correlation between openness and government size may be driven by country size,
as larger countries trade less and may have smaller governments due to scale economies
in the provision of public goods. Our results show that income is negatively correlated
33General government production equals the value of all goods and services produced by employees of the
State (at all levels of government) and distributed without charge or at prices which are not economically
signicant. General government consumption expenditure equals instead the general government produc-
tion (less any fees collected) plus government purchases of goods and services that are distributed without
charge to the community. See the UN report (2001) for a detailed analysis of the degree of comparability
of these data across countries and overtime.
34Openness and government consumption are measured at current prices, as in most of the literature.
A previous version of the paper, Epifani and Gancia (2007), showed that the results are unchanged when
measuring these variables at constant prices.
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with government consumption.35 The link between country size and governments is also
negative, though imprecisely estimated.36 More importantly, the openness coe¢ cient is
una¤ected by the inclusion of these controls. In column (3), we exclude all Western
European countries from the sample to take into account that these countries are typically
very open and have large governments, and may therefore have a disproportionate inuence
on the openness coe¢ cient. The results are essentially identical. In column (4), we add a
full set of regional dummies (from the PWT). The openness coe¢ cient is slightly reduced
but is very precisely estimated notwithstanding the loss of degrees of freedom. In column
(5), we add two variables that may capture the e¤ect of external shocks on government
spending: the standard deviation of terms of trade (lagged 5 years, from the PWT) and
its interaction with openness. As suggested by Rodrik (1998), the interaction term is
meant to capture the fact that more open economies may be more exposed to external
shocks and hence demand more public insurance. Its coe¢ cient is wrong signed, however,
whereas the openness coe¢ cient is still large and signicant beyond the one percent level.
In column (6), we include other controls. First, we add the political regime using
the proxy polity2 (drawn from the Polity IV dataset).37 Second, we control for nancial
restrictions to take into account that trade openness may be correlated with nancial
openness, which is unrelated to our theoretical framework. In particular, we add the black
market premium (from the World Bank) and three dummy variables (from the IMF) taking
value of one in the presence of current account restrictions, exchange rate restrictions and
capital account restrictions, respectively. None of our political and nancial controls can
explain the cross-sectional variation in government consumption, whereas the openness
coe¢ cient is still large and very precisely estimated. Finally, in column (7) we include all
the previous controls in the same specication and nd no change in the results.
Regarding quantitative magnitudes, our estimates suggest that a 1 percentage point
increase in the openness ratio brings about (roughly) a 0.15 percentage point increase in
the government share of GDP. Together with the fact that openness increased on average
by 42.5 percentage points in the second half of the last century, the growth of trade volumes
alone can explain a 6.4 percentage points increase of g, i.e., more than one half of its total
increase (11.8 percentage points).
35See also Ram (1987) on this point.
36The relationship between government and country size is theoretically ambiguous. On the one hand,
Alesina and Wacziarg (1998) have shown that large countries should have smaller (larger) governments if
the elasticity of substitution between private and public goods is lower (higher) than one. On the other,
bigger countries may enjoy stronger terms of trade e¤ects and thus have larger governments. It is thus not
surprising that we do not nd robust evidence on the impact of country size.
37This variable takes values in the range -10 (autocracy) to 10 (democracy) according to the degree of
openness of political institutions.
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In columns (8)-(10), we rerun some of the above specications using central govern-
ment transfers for social security and welfare as the dependent variable. Investigating the
relationship between openness and this type of expenditure is interesting because, if trade
increases the demand for insurance, this may show up in a surge of public transfers.38 Our
evidence does not lend support to this hypothesis, as the coe¢ cient of openness is now
small and insignicant or even wrong signed. Terms of trade variability does not seem
to a¤ect this kind of government expenditure either. Finally, column (11) shows that the
results are not driven by the change in sample size when using data on social security and
welfare: keeping the same sample and using government consumption as the dependent
variable, we nd that the openness coe¢ cient is actually larger than in the broader sample
(see column 5) and very precisely estimated.
Having shown that the cross-sectional correlation between openness and government
consumption is robust, we now explore its determinants. Recall that a crucial feature of
the model in Section 2 is that the terms of trade externality, which makes an expansion
of the public sector less costly in open countries, is stronger for low elasticity . At the
same time, a low  weakens the link between globalization and governments through the
demand for insurance, due to the compensatory role of price adjustments. In order to
provide an answer to the critical question of whether the positive correlation between
openness and government size is contingent on  being high (the insurance hypothesis)
or low (the externality view), we appeal to a simple strategy to build a proxy of  for
individual countries. In particular, we exploit the fact that the elasticity of substitution
is lower among di¤erentiated goods. This suggests that countries exporting di¤erentiated
products face, on average, a less elastic demand than countries specialized in homogeneous
commodities. Moving from this observation, we combine data on the structure of com-
modity exports with Rauch (1999)s classication of traded goods into di¤erentiated and
homogenous products to compute the following variable:
zrai =
X
j
draj
EXPij
EXPi
;
where EXPij is country is export in sector j, EXPi is total export and draj is a dummy
equal to one if industry js output is classied as di¤erentiated by Rauch. Thus, zrai
measures the share of di¤erentiated products in country is export basket, and we use it
38Alesina and Wacziarg (1998) nd that the correlation between government size and openness is stronger
when using current central government expenditure (which includes transfers) instead of government con-
sumption as the dependent variable. They therefore argue that the correlation may be driven by gov-
ernment transfers, but do not provide direct evidence on this. However, government consumption and
central government expenditure di¤er substantially not only because of transfers but also because the
latter excludes all self-nanced expenditures by lower levels of government.
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as an inverse proxy for :We can then directly test how the correlation between openness
and government size depends on  by simply introducing an interaction term between
openness and zrai . To compute z
ra
i , we use trade data at the 4-digit SITC (rev.2) level of
disaggregation (from the UN-Comtrade dataset), so as to match Rauchs classication.39
We use data for the year 2000 to maximize sample size (125 observations overall). A table
listing the value of zrai for each country is reported in the Appendix.
With this new variable at hand, in Table 2 we reexamine the cross-sectional evidence
on the correlation between openness and government size. In column (1), we regress
government consumption on zrai and openness only, and nd that the openness coe¢ cient is
una¤ected by the inclusion of the new control, which turns out insignicant. In column (2),
we perform our crucial test by adding the interaction between openness and zrai . Strikingly,
the coe¢ cient of openness drops to zero, whereas the coe¢ cient of the interaction term is
positive, large and signicant beyond the one percent level. This suggests that openness is
positively correlated with the size of government only for countries exporting di¤erentiated
goods. In column (3), we add our baseline controls, income and population, and nd that
the results are una¤ected. In column (4), we add a full set of regional dummies: the t
improves substantially and our results become stronger.
One possible concern is that our results may be driven by the fact that our proxy is
correlated with income and institutional quality (the simple correlation of zrai with these
variables is roughly 0.4). In column (5), we therefore control for the interaction between
openness and income, whereas in column (6) we use Rule of Law (from Kaufmann, Kraay
and Mastruzzi, 2005) to proxy for institutional quality, and interact it with openness.
In both specications, the coe¢ cients of openness and the new controls are insignicant,
suggesting the correlation between openness and government size to be independent of
the level of development. In contrast, the sign and signicance of the coe¢ cient of the
interaction between openness and zrai rise even further.
In columns (7) and (8), we control for terms of trade variability using two di¤erent
measures: in the former we use the standard deviation of terms of trade, in the latter
the standard deviation of the log change of the terms of trade over the entire period
1960-2000. We also interact these variables with the openness ratio. Our main results are
unchanged, whereas the interactions with terms of trade variability are wrong signed. In
column (9), following Rodrik (1998), we include the normalized Herndahl index of export
concentration and its interaction with openness.40 Both controls turn out insignicant
39A good is dened as di¤erentiated if it is neither sold on an organized exchange, nor reference priced
in a trade publication. This classication is widely used in the literature.
40This term may capture the fact that highly concentrated exports may increase the exposure to risk.
We use data for the year 2000 from the UNCTAD-Handbook of Statistics to compute it.
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while leaving the other results unchanged. Finally, in column (10) we include all controls
in the same specication and nd that the coe¢ cient of the interaction between zrai and
openness is una¤ected, whereas most of the other controls are insignicant.
Is zrai a good proxy for 1= in our model? We address the concerns on the quality
of zrai by constructing an alternative proxy using a di¤erent source of information on the
cross-industry variation in elasticities of substitution. In particular, we appeal to Broda
and Weinstein (2006)s recent estimates of the elasticity of substitution across 4-digit SITC
industries to compute, for each country in the sample, the following variable:
zbwi =
X
j
1
bw
j
EXPij
EXPi
where bw
j
is Broda and Weinsteins estimate of the elasticity of substitution in sector j.
Note that the only di¤erence between zrai and z
bw
i is that in the latter we have replaced a
dichotomous indicator, draj , of whether or not an industrys output is di¤erentiated with a
point estimate of an industrys elasticity of substitution. The proxy zbwi is therefore even
more closely related to our model, although possibly subject to larger measurement error.
The simple correlation between zrai and z
bw
i is reassuringly high (0:50). In Table 3, we
rerun the same specications of Table 2 using zbwi instead z
ra
i : Note that the pattern of
results is essentially unchanged: when introducing the interaction between openness and
zbwi , the coe¢ cient of openness becomes small and insignicant and the results are not
a¤ected by the other control variables. The coe¢ cient of the interaction between openness
and zbwi is instead always large and signicant at conventional levels, although slightly less
precisely estimated in some specications.41
3.2 Panel-Data Evidence
So far, we have relied on cross-sectional variation to estimate the coe¢ cients of interest.
Yet, some of our variables are available from the Penn World Tables over a period of
half a century (1950-2000). Hence, to fully exploit the available information, we now
complement our previous analysis by reporting panel-data results.42 This also allows us
41Using both zrai and z
bw
i , our results are unchanged when dropping all the Western European countries
from the sample. This robustness check is not reported to save space.
42This also allows us to complement the evidence in Rodrik (1998) and Alesina and Wacziarg (1998),
which is mainly cross-sectional. Many other empirical studies have investigated the determinants of the
size of the public sector. A review of this literature is beyond the scope of this paper. For the interested
reader, we refer to the important contributions of Persson and Tabellini (1999 and 2003) and Alesina and
Glaeser (2004).
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to control for unobserved country heterogeneity that does not vary over time.43 We start,
as in the previous section, by showing evidence on the correlation between openness and
government size and then test whether it is contingent on a low elasticity of substitution,
as suggested by our previous results.
Table 4 reports Fixed-E¤ects within estimates using government consumption (columns
1-5 and 9) and central government expenditure for social security and welfare (columns
6-8) as the dependent variables. All variables are computed as ve-year averages from
1950-54 to 1990-94 and as six-year averages in the last period (1995-00). The openness
ratio is lagged one period (except in the dynamic specications of columns 2 and 7), and
outlier countries with a trade share greater than 200 percent are excluded. In column (1),
we control for per capita income, population and time dummies.44 The coe¢ cient of open-
ness is positive and signicant beyond the one percent level. In column (2), we examine a
dynamic specication in which we also control for lagged government consumption to take
into account that public spending is generally persistent and may therefore react slowly
to changes in the economic environment.45 As is well known, Fixed-E¤ects estimates are
severely biased when the lagged dependent variable is included among the regressors and
we therefore report bias-corrected estimates according to Kiviet (1995).46 The results are
strong: the coe¢ cient of openness is still very precisely estimated, whereas those of income
and population are now insignicant. The coe¢ cient of the lagged dependent variable is
also large and signicant, conrming that public spending is persistent. These estimates
imply that the long-run impact of openness on government consumption (0.039/(1-0.84)
43Although our empirical analysis relies on di¤erent approaches to address the endogeneity due to omitted
variables, it does not address the direction of causality between openness and government size. On this
respect, we do not have much to add to Rodrik (1998), who showed that openness in 1960 is a good
predictor for the subsequent growth of government size and that the correlation holds when openness is
instrumented with geographical variables. These ndings, that are not replicated to save space, support
our prior that public spending is more endogenous than openness. In any event, our crucial test does not
require sorting causality, as the terms of trade explanation can be made consistent with reverse causality
too: if openness had an endogenous component, countries with a strong preference for public goods would
prefer to be open. The resulting correlation would still be contingent on a low elasticity.
44The inclusion of time-dummies is not su¢ cient to avoid spurious results if the main variables are
non-stationary. On this respect, we have performed panel unit root tests on our measures of openness and
government consumption using the t -test based on OLS estimates. The test is advocated, among others,
by Bond et al. (2002) due to its relatively high power. The null hypothesis of a unit root is always rejected
at the one percent level.
45So far, we have only taken into account of this fact by using the lagged value of the openness ratio.
46Kiviet (1995) derives an approximate formula for the small-sample bias of the Fixed-E¤ects estimator.
An alternative would be to use Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimators. The main advantage
of Kiviets estimator is that it exploits the fact that the Fixed-E¤ects estimator, although seriously biased,
has a much smaller variance than the consistent GMM estimators, implying that bias-corrected Fixed-
E¤ects estimates are generally more e¢ cient. We also estimated column (2) in the table by (uncorrected)
Fixed-E¤ects and by GMM. In both cases the openness coe¢ cient is positive and signicant, but GMM
estimates prove very large and sensitive to the details of the estimation procedure (implicitly conrming
Kiviets results).
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= 0.24 ) is roughly of the same order of magnitude as in our cross-sectional regressions.
In column (3), we control for the standard deviation of the terms of trade (lagged one
period) and its interaction with openness: both controls are insignicant and leave the
openness coe¢ cient una¤ected. In column (4), we add polity and nancial controls. The
coe¢ cients of the black market premium and capital account restrictions are now positive
and signicant, which is consistent with the idea that nancial globalization promotes
tax competition and thus smaller governments. More important for our purposes, the
openness coe¢ cient is una¤ected. In column (5), we add country-specic linear trends
and nd that the size and signicance of the openness coe¢ cient increase.47 In columns
(6)-(8), we rerun some of the above regressions using government transfers for social se-
curity and welfare as the dependent variable. The coe¢ cient of openness drops to zero or
even becomes negative, conrming our previous result that openness is unrelated to public
transfers. Once again, the result is not driven by the change in sample size: in column
(9), we use government consumption as the dependent variable for the same sample and
nd that the openness coe¢ cient is large and signicant.48
Finally, and most importantly, in Tables 5 and 6 we test whether the positive asso-
ciation between openness and government consumption is contingent on a low elasticity
of substitution. We use zrai to proxy for 1= in Table 5, and z
bw
i in Table 6. In Table 5,
we start with a univariate regression of government consumption on the openness ratio
(column 1) to show that simply adding the interaction between openness and zrai (column
2) causes the openness coe¢ cient to become small and insignicant. The coe¢ cient of
the interaction term is instead positive, large and signicant at the 2 percent level. In
column (3), we add our standard controls (income, population and time dummies) and
nd that the coe¢ cient of the interaction term grows larger and signicant beyond the one
percent level, whereas the openness coe¢ cient is still small and insignicant. In columns
(4)-(8), we show that the results do not change when adding, individually or altogether,
the interactions of openness with income, institutional quality, terms of trade variability
and export concentration. In Table 6, nally, we rerun the same specications using zbwi
instead of zrai and nd equally strong results: the coe¢ cient of openness is never positive
and signicant, whereas the coe¢ cient of the interaction between openness and zbwi is
always positive, very large and signicant beyond the one percent level.49
47Note that adding country-specic linear trends turns the coe¢ cient of country size from positive to
negative, probably suggesting that country size may capture the e¤ect of a time trend in Fixed-E¤ects
regressions.
48A previous version of the paper, Epifani and Gancia (2007), showed that the positive association
between openness and government consumption holds also in the sub-periods 1950-75 and 1975-00, and
that it has strengthened overtime.
49Once again, using both zrai and z
bw
i , our results are unchanged when dropping all Western European
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3.3 Evidence on Terms of Trade Externalities
We now look for direct evidence on the terms of trade externality. A crucial feature of
our theory is that a 1 percent increase in private output induces a 1= percent fall in the
terms of trade (see equation 4): we now show that the data are consistent with this notion
that fast growing countries experience a terms of trade deterioration, and hence that 
is not too high for the average country. To start with, we use equation (4) to estimate a
cross-country average of the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods.
In particular, we estimate cross-sectional regressions of the form:
dpi = + dyi +X
0
i + "i; (25)
where dpi  d ln(pi=Q) is the growth rate of country is terms of trade,  is a constant
term, dyi  d ln(yi=Y ) is the growth rate of country is private output relative to world
output, X 0i is a vector of controls and "i is a random disturbance. Our parameter of
interest,  =  1=, captures the terms of trade externality.
We estimate (25) for the period 1960-2000 (or nearly so, depending on data availabil-
ity). One concern with terms of trade data is that their movements are a¤ected by global
changes in commodity prices that may be unrelated to country-specic developments,
possibly hiding the mechanism we want to test. For instance, Backus and Crucini (2000)
have shown that terms of trade movements in the US are dominated by the behavior of
oil prices. Therefore, in order to better isolate terms of trade changes due to a countrys
relative growth performance, we net out the e¤ect of changes in the fuel-prices from the
growth rate of terms of trade.50 Following Backus and Crucini (2000), non-fuel terms of
trade (ToTnf ) can be expressed as:
ToTnfi =
P xi
Pmi
Sxnfi
Smnfi
qxi
qmi
;
where P xi =P
m
i are the overall terms of trade, namely, the ratio of export prices, P
x
i , to
import prices, Pmi ; S
xnf
i (S
mnf
i ) is the value of non-fuel exports (imports) as a share of
total exports (imports); qxi (q
m
i ) is the ratio of the quantity of non-fuel exports (imports)
to the quantity of total trade. As in Backus and Crucini, and given the data at hand, we
assume the ratio qxi =q
m
i to be constant overtime, thereby ignoring time variation in the
physical quantity of fuel to non-fuel trade. Data on the average growth rate of overall
countries from the sample.
50A previous version of the paper, Epifani and Gancia (2007), provided evidence on the terms of trade
externality using data on the growth rate of overall terms of trade.
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terms of trade are from the PWT, whereas data on the average growth rate of non-fuel
import and export shares are drawn from the UN Comtrade database.
Output of the private sector is measured as real GDP net of government consumption.
Note that the growth rate of world output, Y , is constant across countries and is therefore
absorbed by the constant term, . However, due to transport costs and other trade
barriers, the set of trading partners may vary across countries, implying that the growth
rate of country is trading partners does not coincide with the growth rate of world output.
To cope with this, as a robustness check, we will compute Y for each country as the trade-
weighted average of its commercial partnersGDP. This data is drawn from the World
Bank.
We estimate (25) by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and by Instrumental Variables
(IV). OLS estimates raise a standard identication problem, as  represents a parameter
of world demand for domestic products. To identify it, we should isolate variations in
domestic supply orthogonal to changes in the terms of trade. Otherwise, demand shocks
(e.g., preference shifts in favor of a countrys exports) would tend to generate a positive
correlation between output growth and changes in the terms of trade, biasing  towards
zero and  towards innite. OLS estimates mixing demand and supply changes can
however provide a useful lower bound for the terms of trade externality.
As for IV estimates, we follow Acemoglu and Ventura (2002) in instrumenting the
growth rate of output with the right hand side variables of a convergence equation à la
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995). The idea is to isolate the source of variation in growth
rates that is explained by a countrys distance from its steady-state and use it to estimate
, under the assumption that growth due to convergence is exogenous to the terms of
trade. We will therefore estimate (25) by Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) using a rst
stage regression for dyi of the following type:
dyi = #+ y0i + Z
0
i'+X
0
i + i; (26)
where y0i is the log of private output at the beginning of the period, # is a constant,
Z 0i is a set of additional excluded instruments, X
0
i is the vector of included instruments
and i is a random disturbance.  < 0 captures the speed of conditional convergence
toward the steady state. We start by using only y0i as an excluded instrument. Thus,
our identication relies on the exogeneity of GDP in 1960 to the subsequent growth of
the terms of trade. Then, to gain e¢ ciency, we add some standard determinants of steady
state income among the excluded instruments Z 0i and check their exogeneity with the
overidentication test. Finally, we include the growth rate of the public sector among the
covariates X 0i in order to test another piece of our mechanism: that the growth of the
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public sector crowds out private output (its expected sign is therefore negative in the rst
stage regressions) and that it has no other direct e¤ect on the terms of trade (implying a
zero coe¢ cient in the second stage regressions).
Table 7 reports the main results. We start with three univariate OLS regressions: in
column (1) we regress the growth rate of non-fuel terms of trade on the growth rate of
total private GDP, in column (2) we use the growth rate of private GDP per capita and
in column (3) the growth rate of private per capita GDP relative to trading partners. The
results are essentially identical: the point estimates suggest a 1 percent increase in the
growth rate of private output to bring a 0.32 percent fall in the terms of trade, implying
an elasticity of substitution, , of 3.
In columns (4)-(7) we report Instrumental Variables estimates. The mid panel displays
Two-Stage Least Squares estimates for the growth rate of non-fuel terms of trade. The
rst line gives estimates of  =  1=. The bottom panel displays the rst stage regressions
for the growth rate of private GDP and two tests for the quality of our instruments: the
value of the F -statistic of excluded instruments and the p-value of Hansens J -statistic
of overidentifying restrictions. For comparison, the upper panel reports OLS estimates
of . In column (4), we instrument the growth rate of private per capita GDP with the
log of its initial level. We also add, as included instruments, two proxies for the initial
level of human capital, i.e., the logs of average years of schooling and of life expectancy.51
As expected, the estimated terms of trade externality is larger than in OLS regressions,
although it is signicant at the 10 percent level only. The coe¢ cients of the two proxies for
initial human capital are instead close to zero and statistically insignicant in the second
stage regression, suggesting that they have no direct impact on the growth of terms of
trade. In column (5), we treat them as excluded instruments. The oveidentication test is
insignicant and the F -statistic is very high, suggesting our instruments to be valid and
relevant. In this case, the terms of trade externality is very precisely estimated. In column
(6), we add two included instruments: the growth rate of average years of schooling and
the growth rate of the government share of GDP. Consistent with our model, the growth
rate of government consumption has a large and statistically signicant negative impact
on the growth rate of private output in the rst stage regression. In contrast, it has no
signicant impact on the terms of trade in the second stage, suggesting that government
size a¤ects the terms of trade only through its e¤ect on private output.52 Moreover, the
51These variables are sourced, respectively, from the Barro-Lee database and the World Bank. In order
to save observations, when possible we have replaced missing values with regional averages.
52These results are interesting and in line with our theory, but must be interpreted with caution, since
government output is endogenous. It is reassuring, however, that the estimated terms of trade e¤ect is
unchanged and that our instruments pass both tests.
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estimated terms of trade externality is still signicant at the one percent level, whereas
the growth of schooling proves insignicant in both the rst and second stage regressions.
In column (7), we rerun the same specication using the growth rate of private per capita
GDP relative to trading partners and nd even stronger results.
In sum, our IV estimates imply that a 1 percent increase in the growth rate of GDP
brings about a 0.39-0.45 percent fall in the terms of trade, consistent with an elasticity
of substitution between 2:2 and 2:6. This result is in line with the value (  2:6) found
by Acemoglu and Ventura (2002) using di¤erent data and the estimates in Broda and
Weinstein (2006).53 Finally, by comparing IV and OLS results, we can note that OLS
estimates of the terms of trade externality are always smaller than IV estimates, as ex-
pected, though still signicant. This suggests that IV results are not an artifact of the
instrumenting strategy.54
Having shown that the terms of trade externality is strong for the average country,
we now reestimate it across country groups to perform a nal test of our theory: to show
that the terms of trade externality is stronger for those countries that exhibit a stronger
correlation between openness and government size. To this end, we split our sample into
two groups of equal size: the rst group includes the countries that contribute relatively
more to estimating a positive correlation between openness and government size, while
the second group includes all other countries.55 Countries belonging to the two groups
are listed in the Appendix. Those in the rst group tend to be larger (this group includes
all the G-8 countries plus China), slightly richer, and have a higher propensity to export
di¤erentiated products. All these characteristics suggest that they might indeed be less
price takers. In contrast, countries that have experienced export led growth (e.g., the
Asian Tigers) belong to the second group. This is not surprising, as restraining the export
sector does not seem the best policy for countries that achieve high growth by promoting
exports. Finally, data quality (according to the PWT documentation) is very similar
across groups.
In Table 8, we estimate the elasticity of substitution for the two sets of countries
using the same specications as in Table 7. The table displays OLS estimates of ,
53Working with disaggregated data for the period 1972-2001, Broda and Weinstein (2006) report a
median value for the elasticity of substitution between US varieties in the interval 2.7 - 3.6.
54 In a previous version of the paper, Epifani and Gancia (2007), we also provide evidence that terms
of trade externalities have grown stronger over time, a result consistent with the independent ndings
of Broda and Weinstein (2006). Thus, even if one may expect globalization per se to increase demand
elasticities, we do not have evidence of any weakening of terms of trade e¤ects.
55To split the sample, we started from a baseline Fixed-E¤ects regression of government consumption
on openness, income, population and time dummies. Then, for each country, we computed the average
di¤erence between the estimated coe¢ cient for openness when the observation is included and excluded,
scaled by the estimated standard error of the coe¢ cient (the so-called DF beta). Countries with a higher
DF beta are those whose inclusion in the sample has a larger positive impact on the coe¢ cient of openness.
31
2SLS regressions and rst stage statistics. Panel a) shows the results for the sub-sample
of countries with a stronger correlation between openness and government size. OLS
estimates of the terms of trade externality are always large and signicant at the 1 or
5 percent levels, implying a value of the elasticity of substitution between 1:7 and 2:1.
2SLS estimates are even larger and very stable across specications, implying a value of
  1:5. They are also signicant at the 1 to 5 percent levels, except in one specication
(see column 4).56 Considering the sub-sample of countries with a weaker correlation
between openness and government size (panel b), the results are strikingly di¤erent: IV
and OLS estimates of the terms of trade externality are always small, insignicant, and
in some cases wrong signed.57 In conclusion, all our empirical results consistently support
the view that openness increases government size only for countries that are not price
takers.
4 Conclusion
We close with some remarks on the policy implications of our ndings. It is well-known
that governments in a global economy may have incentives to use tari¤s to manipulate
the terms of trade in their favor. By removing these incentives, the WTO principles
may provide a solution to the ine¢ ciencies that would arise under non-cooperative tari¤
setting (Bagwell and Staiger, 1999). As shown in this paper, however, even the simplest
form of domestic taxation may produce similar terms of trade e¤ects. Are then the WTO
rules adequate to deal with this problem as well? We believe they are not, because
scal policies are seen as a matter of national sovereignty that goes beyond the WTO
jurisdiction. Other widespread forms of international economic integration do not deal
with this problem either. For example, preferential trade agreements and custom unions
do not involve political coordination on scal issues. As a result, market integration and
political cooperation have followed rather independent routes.
By imposing constraints on scal policy to member states, the EU may appear in this
respect an exception. Even in this case, however, we think that too little has been done.
Much of the debate on the coordination of scal policies has been centred on the Stability
and Growth Pact that imposes limits to budget decits and debt. Even if those limits
may be given some economic rationale, they do not provide a solution to the ine¢ ciency
illustrated in this paper, because the latter arises from too high a level of public spending
56Not coincidentally, in this specication the F -statistic of excluded instruments reaches a minimum,
falling marginally below the threshold value of 10. Otherwise, the rst stage statistics support our choice
of instruments as the F -statistic is high and the J -statistic is always insignicant.
57First stage statistics seem to support our choice of instruments also in this sub-sample.
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and not from excessive debt or decits. Thus, while the EU may provide an appropriate
institutional framework to achieve policy coordination, measures so far adopted seem
neither necessary nor su¢ cient to correct scal externalities due to globalization.
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5 Appendix
5.1 Home Bias in Government Consumption
We use the OECD Input-Output Tables, available for a sample of 14 developed and devel-
oping countries around the year 2000, to measure the degree of home bias in government
consumption. Table A1 reports, for each country in the sample, government import as a
share of government consumption and total import as a share of total GDP. Note that
economy-wide import shares are several orders of magnitude greater than those of the pub-
lic sector in all countries. These gures are consistent with those reported in other studies.
For instance, according to the European Commission (1997), imports accounted for less
than 2% of public purchases in EU countries in the late 80s (compared to economy-wide
import shares ranging from 25 to 45). Inspection of the Input-Output Tables reveals that
an important reason why government spending is home-biased is that, consistent with our
model, public goods and services are produced by relying disproportionately on domestic
labor: purchases of intermediate goods by the public sector are in fact a small share of
government consumption (hardly greater than 10%) in most countries.
5.2 Openness and the Size of Government with Asymmetric Countries
We show how to modify the model to allow for cross-country di¤erences in all the para-
meters. For simplicity, we limit to partial equilibrium in that we do not solve for world
quantities. This is without loss of generality since any (small) country takes world pro-
duction as given. First, we allow the range of traded goods to vary across countries, so
that in di¤erent countries di¤erent sectors may produce for world markets. For trade to
be feasible, we assume that for any good that is traded in a country there is a positive
number of countries where products from the same sector are traded as well.58 This means
that varieties produced in a given sector can be nontraded everywhere, traded by a subset
of countries only, or traded by all countries. We denote the number of countries where
industry j is traded as Nj and the total mass of traded sectors in country i as  i.
Second, we assume that  varies across goods but that a country only trades goods
with the same . This is intended as a shortcut for a more general model where  varies
across exports and the  we consider represents an appropriate country-average. The
important feature we want to capture here is that countries may di¤er in their ability to
a¤ect the terms of trade due to the product characteristics of their export. Our assumption
delivers this in the most parsimonious way. Finally, we allow the preference for private
58We also maintain the assumption that a country is always small in international markets.
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consumption, i, to vary across countries.
Let us consider country i and, for simplicity, abstract from uncertainty ( = 0). Con-
sumption of goods produced in sector j can be found as follows. If good j is nontraded,
then consumption is equal to domestic production:
Yi;j = Li;j : (27)
If good j is traded, domestic consumption equals disposable income divided by the price
index in sector j:
Yi;j =
wi
Qj
Li (1  gi) =
h
(Li;j)
 1 (Nj)  1 Yw;j
i1=
Li (1  gi) : (28)
Next, we need to solve for Li;j . In nontraded sectors, domestic expenditure equals the
value of domestic production, (1  gi)wiLi = wiLi;j , so that Li;j = (1  gi)Li. Labor
market clearing requires:Z 1
0
Li;jdj = (1   i) (1  gi)Li +  iLi; = (1  gi)Li;
where Li; is employment in the average traded sector. Solving:
Li; = (1  gi)Li:
Labor allocation across traded sectors will vary in an asymmetric equilibrium. Equalizing
wages in any two traded sectors j and z we have:
Li;j = Li;z

Nj
Nz
 (+1) Yw;j
Yw;z

Qj
Qz

:
Integrating over the set   of traded sectors in country i, we nd:
Li;j = i;jLi; ;
where i;j  (Nj)
 (+1)Yw;j(Qj)R
 (Nz)
 (+1)Yw;z(Qz)dz
is a constant. Finally, with the expressions for Li;j
at hand, we can substitute (27) and (28) into utility:
Ci =

exp
Z 1
0
log Yi;jdj
i
G
1 i
i = Ki
h
(1  gi)1 
i
i
ii
g
1 i
i ;
where Ki collects all terms that are taken as given by country i. Maximizing Ci with
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respect to gi gives:
gi =
1  i
1  i i=i
;
which is a simple generalization of equation (15) in the text.
5.3 Taxation and Optimal Trade Policy
We now show that our results hold even when the government can set an optimal trade
tax or, eqivalently, an import tari¤. Consider, for example, an export tax whose revenue
is redistributed to consumers, so that its only purpose is to maximize domestic income by
improving the terms of trade as in the basic optimal tari¤ argument. For simplicity, we
focus on the model with no uncertainty ( = 0). Let p be the price of a traded variety
inclusive of the export tax t. The after tax revenue from selling one unit, p (1  t), is the
wage of the worker who produced it:
p (1  t) = w = pn; (29)
where pn is the price of a nontraded good. Thus, the e¤ect of the export tax is to introduce
a wedge between the price of exported and nontraded goods. Cobb-Douglas preferences
and trade balance imply that income is evenly distributed across sectors: pL = pnLn,
where L and Ln are employment in the typical traded and nontraded industry, respec-
tively. Substituting (29) yields labor allocation in each sector: L = (1  t)Ln: As ex-
pected, the export tax shifts labor out of exporting industries and allows the government
to choose employment levels in traded and nontraded sectors. With full employment,
these are:
L =
(1  t) (1  g)
1  t L; (30)
Ln =
1  g
1  t L: (31)
Substituting (30) for (1 g)L into (11) and similarly (31) into (10), we get new expressions
for Y and Yn that in turn can be used with (12) to obtain the new objective function for
the government:
Max
fg; tg
U =

1  g
1  t
(1 )((1  t) (1  g)
1  t
 1

N (+1)=

Yw
L
 1

)
(gL)1  : (32)
Then, the rst order condition for t requires t =  1, conrming the well-known result that
the optimal export tax is the inverse of the foreign demand elasticity. More importantly,
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it is easy to verify from (32) that the rst order condition for g is still given by (15). The
intuition for this result is as follows. Terms of trade considerations induce the government
to restrict output of traded goods. The optimal tari¤a¤ects the allocation of labor between
traded and non traded goods within the private sector, yet the government also wants to
change the allocation between private and public (non traded) goods. The latter goal
cannot be achieved with trade policy only.59
5.4 International labor mobility
Following models of tax competition (see, for example, Gordon, 1983, or the survey in
Persson and Tabellini, 1995), the e¤ect of international labor mobility can be studied,
albeit in a reduced form way, by assuming that the domestic labor force is elastic to
taxation g. In particular, we dene  as the elasticity of L to changes in taxation:
 =   g
L
@L
@g
> 0:
The idea is that some workers decide to migrate abroad as the tax rate increases, so that
 captures the degree of labor mobility. Although in a symmetric equilibrium workers will
not move, the fact that governments are aware of the possible labor reaction is enough to
a¤ect their incentives. Maximization of (13) now yields a modied rst order condition:

1  g

1  


+ (1  ) 
g
=
1  
g
+



g
:
Note that  increases both the cost (the left hand side) and the benet (the right hand
side) of taxation. On the cost side, the loss is due to the fact that G is non-rival so that
there are increasing returns in the provision of the public good. On the benet side, a
drop in L leads to a positive terms of trade improvement. Solving for g:
g =
1   +      1 + 
1   + 
 
   1 + 
 :
Note that, as long as  <  (1  ) =, an elastic labor supply lowers g, as in tax compe-
tition models, but it may reinforce the e¤ect of  :
@g
@
=
 [1   +  (2   1)]


1   + 
 
   1 + 
2 :
59See also Boadway, Maital and Prachowny (1973) on the independence between optimal tari¤s and
domestic taxation.
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Su¢ cient conditions for @g@ to increase with  are  > 0:5 and  <
1  


1  

  > 1. Given
that only a handful of countries have a government share higher than 50% of GDP and
that international migration is still limited, these conditions do not seem very restrictive.
5.5 Country Groups
The countries with a relatively stronger association between openness and government
size are: Albania, Angola, Antigua, Argentina, Australia, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium,
Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad,
China, Comoros, Costa Rica, Cote dIvoire, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Re-
public, Equatorial Guinea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Gambia, Germany, Greece,
Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Iceland, Iran, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kyrgyzstan,
Lesotho, Madagascar, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand,
Nigeria, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles,
Sierra Leone, Slovak Republic, Spain, Switzerland, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Turkey,
Uganda, Ukraine, United Kingdom, Uruguay, USA, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Vietnam.
The other countries are: Algeria, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Barbados, Benin,
Botswana, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Cape Verde, Chile, Colombia, Congo,
Congo, Dem. Rep., Cuba, Cyprus, Dominica, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Fiji, Gabon,
Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Haiti, Honduras, Hong Kong, Hungary, India, In-
donesia, Ireland, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Latvia, Lebanon, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macao,
Macedonia, Malawi, Malaysia, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Nicaragua, Niger,
Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Philippines, Republic of Ko-
rea, Rwanda, Senegal, Singapore, Slovenia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, St. Kitts & Nevis,
St. Lucia, St.Vincent & Grenadines, Sweden, Syria, Taiwan, Trinidad &Tobago, Tunisia,
Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Gov. Cons.
(same sample)
Openness 0.149*** 0.138*** 0.132*** 0.104*** 0.167*** 0.150*** 0.192*** 0.033 -0.006 0.029 0.188***
[0.031] [0.033] [0.042] [0.032] [0.039] [0.034] [0.047] [0.024] [0.027] [0.039] [0.051]
Log of Income -4.346*** -2.832*** -6.055*** -6.271*** -4.970*** -5.618*** 4.052*** 2.568*** -4.816**
[0.759] [0.953] [1.180] [1.125] [1.300] [1.317] [0.593] [0.762] [2.054]
Log of Population -1.138 -1.118 -1.767** -1.678** 0.336 0.016 -0.597 0.551 -0.871
[0.692] [0.754] [0.719] [0.725] [0.831] [0.973] [0.536] [0.654] [0.796]
ToT Variability 6.771 8.523* 1.212 7.143*
[4.397] [4.536] [2.676] [3.665]
Openness × ToT Var. -0.149** -0.139* -0.040 -0.213*
[0.071] [0.076] [0.067] [0.118]
Polity -0.255 -0.186
[0.293] [0.268]
Black Market Premium -0.000 -0.000
[0.000] [0.000]
Current Account Restr. 2.592 1.856
[3.022] [3.068]
Exchange Rate Restr. -2.956 -3.176
[2.838] [2.974]
Capital Account Restr. 1.556 1.584
[1.931] [1.973]
Regional Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 143 143 115 143 131 111 104 58 58 55 55
R-squared 0.20 0.38 0.30 0.54 0.55 0.60 0.60 0.03 0.41 0.76 0.61
Cross-sectional OLS estimates with robust standard errors in brackets. ***,**,* = significant at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. All variables are computed as period
averages for the years 1995-2000, with the openness ratio lagged one five-year period. The dependent variable is government consumption in colums (1)-(7) and (11), and
government expenditure for social security and welfare in columns (8)-(10). In column (3), all Western European countries are excluded from the sample. ToT Variability equals 
the standard deviation of terms of trade lagged one period. Polity equals polity2, the combined polity score drawn from the Polity IV dataset. Current Account , Capital Account 
and Exchange Rate Restrictions are dummy variables equal to one in the presence, respectively, of current account, capital account or exchange rate restrictions. Data
sources: PWT 6.1, Polity IV, World Bank and IMF.
Dependent variables: Government Consumption and Gov. Expenditure for Social Security and Welfare (% of GDP)
Table 1. Openness and Government Size (Cross-Sections)
Government Consumption Social Security and
Welfare
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Openness 0.150*** 0.000 0.026 -0.069 0.103 -0.076 0.044 0.052 -0.132 0.234
[0.033] [0.048] [0.048] [0.047] [0.195] [0.049] [0.067] [0.098] [0.105] [0.379]
z i
ra -0.047 -0.241*** -0.125** -0.153** -0.178** -0.188** -0.148** -0.142* -0.158 -0.155*
[0.034] [0.066] [0.062] [0.073] [0.074] [0.082] [0.071] [0.073] [0.098] [0.092]
Openness × z i
ra 0.279*** 0.229*** 0.317*** 0.349*** 0.349*** 0.322*** 0.307*** 0.357*** 0.356***
[0.092] [0.079] [0.069] [0.075] [0.081] [0.068] [0.066] [0.101] [0.100]
Log of Income -4.486*** -6.782*** -5.373*** -7.747*** -6.990*** -6.806*** -6.825*** -6.404**
[0.742] [1.116] [1.891] [1.387] [1.154] [1.176] [1.079] [2.708]
Log of Population -0.491 -0.735 -0.815 -0.570 -0.824 -0.816 -0.554 -0.366
[0.791] [0.717] [0.725] [0.713] [0.695] [0.714] [0.696] [0.695]
Openness × Log of Income -0.022 -0.022
[0.023] [0.036]
Institutional Quality 3.099 2.207
[2.629] [3.548]
Openness × Institutional Quality -0.017 0.002
[0.030] [0.044]
ToT Variability 21.442**
[10.095]
Openness × ToT Variability -0.294**
[0.147]
St. Dev. ∆log of ToT 16.248 18.508
[12.873] [12.948]
Openness × St. Dev. ∆log of ToT -0.250 -0.280
[0.192] [0.201]
Export Concentration -0.012 0.094
[0.134] [0.161]
Openness × Export Concentration 0.131 -0.004
[0.185] [0.235]
Regional Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125
R-squared 0.22 0.28 0.41 0.62 0.62 0.63 0.64 0.63 0.63 0.65
See notes to Table 1. z i
ra is computed as illustrated in the main text using Rauch (1999)'s classification. Institutional Quality is proxied by the Rule of Law index. St. Dev.
∆ log of ToT equals the standard deviation of the log change of terms of trade over the period 1960-2000. Export Concentration is the Herfindahl index of export
concentration in the year 2000. Data sources: PWT 6.1, UN-Comtrade, Governance Matters IV, UNCTAD and Rauch (1999). 
Table 2. Openness, Export Differentiation and Government Size (Cross-Sections, I)
Export Differentiation Proxy (z i
ra ) built on Rauch (1999).
Dependent variable: Government Consumption (% of GDP).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Openness 0.146*** -0.044 -0.023 -0.064 -0.073 -0.074 0.026 0.071 -0.076 0.280
[0.033] [0.087] [0.080] [0.079] [0.328] [0.083] [0.086] [0.120] [0.145] [0.469]
z i
bw -0.053 -0.469** -0.352* -0.304* -0.302 -0.369* -0.325* -0.296* -0.294 -0.334
[0.105] [0.218] [0.197] [0.177] [0.205] [0.199] [0.176] [0.164] [0.215] [0.207]
Openness × z i
bw 0.581** 0.546** 0.541** 0.538* 0.583** 0.568** 0.544*** 0.557* 0.591**
[0.253] [0.245] [0.230] [0.288] [0.260] [0.232] [0.205] [0.302] [0.292]
Log of Income -4.310*** -6.572*** -6.643** -7.541*** -6.700*** -6.565*** -6.538*** -6.123*
[0.805] [1.191] [2.693] [1.492] [1.210] [1.254] [1.208] [3.443]
Log of Population -0.348 -0.787 -0.782 -0.626 -0.858 -0.873 -0.697 -0.602
[0.775] [0.776] [0.781] [0.748] [0.769] [0.776] [0.834] [0.831]
Openness × Log of Income 0.001 0.559
[0.042] [3.863]
Institutional Quality 1.615 0.027
[2.911] [0.050]
Openness × Institutional Quality 0.007 -0.021
[0.036] [0.050]
ToT Variability 18.859
[11.678]
Openness × ToT Variability -0.247
[0.172]
St. Dev. ∆log of ToT 18.189 21.962
[13.371] [14.006]
Openness × St. Dev. ∆log of ToT -0.295 -0.355
[0.198] [0.215]
Export Concentration 0.010 0.063
[0.151] [0.169]
Openness × Export Concentration 0.026 -0.045
[0.219] [0.257]
Regional Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125
R-squared 0.20 0.24 0.40 0.57 0.57 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.57 0.59
Table 3. Openness, Export Differentiation and Government Size (Cross-Sections, II)
Export Differentiation Proxy (z i
bw ) built on Broda and Weinstein (2006). 
See notes to previous tables. z i
bw  is computed as illustrated in the main text using Broda and Weinstein (2006)'s estimates. 
Dependent variable: Government Consumption (% of GDP).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Gov cons.
(same sample)
Lagged Dependent Variable 0.840*** 0.414***
[0.041] [0.100]
Openness 0.054*** 0.039*** 0.060*** 0.068*** 0.076*** -0.003 -0.022* 0.000 0.117***
 [0.015] [0.011] [0.018] [0.022] [0.027] [0.009] [0.012] [0.010]       [0.030]
Log of Income -3.380*** -0.186 -3.173*** 1.185 1.373 -1.632*** -0.484 -1.716*** -5.429***
[0.878] [0.677] [0.965] [1.222] [2.251] [0.582] [0.954] [0.625] [1.974]
Log of Population 7.047*** 1.098 6.851*** 7.723*** -14.711 -8.002*** -2.390 -8.065*** 5.108
[1.651] [1.460] [1.792] [2.400] [11.663] [0.989] [2.105] [1.030] [3.253]
ToT Variability 0.617 0.769 1.313 -0.369 -0.264
[1.292] [1.411] [1.192] [0.475] [1.500]
Openness × ToT Variability -0.022 -0.026 -0.031 0.008 -0.003
[0.019] [0.024] [0.020] [0.007] [0.022]
Polity 0.043 -0.049
[0.065] [0.069]
Black Market Premium 0.002*** 0.002***
[0.000] [0.000]
Current Account Restrictions 0.636 2.147**
[0.933] [0.886]
Exchange Rate Restrictions 0.038 -1.482*
[0.792] [0.780]
Capital Account Restrictions 2.058** 1.413
[1.022] [1.033]
Country-Specific Trends YES
Time Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 973 973 865 558 558 350 254 307 307
Countries 128 128 127 94 94 78 68 76 76
R-squared 0.23 0.23 0.25 0.65 0.37 0.40 0.22
Fixed-Effects within estimates. All variables are computed as five-year averages from 1950-54 to 1990-94 and as six-year averages from 1995 to 2000. The
dependent variable is government consumption in colums (1)-(5) and (9), and government expenditure for social security and welfare in columns (6)-(8).The
openness ratio is lagged one period, except in columns (2) and (7), where the current period average is used instead. Columns (2) and (7) report biased
corrected Fixed-Effects estimates using Kiviet (1995)'s estimator. The number of countries reported in the table refers to those for which at least two
observations are available over the period of analysis. See also notes to previous tables. Data sources: PWT 6.1, Polity IV, World Bank and IMF.
Table 4. Openness and Government Size (Fixed-Effects)
Dependent variables: Government Consumption and Gov. Expenditure for Social Security and Welfare (% of GDP)
Government Consumption Social Security and Welfare
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Openness 0.094*** 0.039 -0.019 0.143 -0.022 -0.004 -0.222*** -0.152
 [0.014] [0.026] [0.023] [0.090] [0.023] [0.026] [0.043] [0.122]
Openness × z i
ra 0.111** 0.147*** 0.166*** 0.160*** 0.135*** 0.280*** 0.283***
[0.047] [0.043] [0.044] [0.044] [0.046] [0.048] [0.052]
Log of Income -2.820*** -1.717 -2.911*** -2.196** -2.378*** -1.278
[0.903] [1.080] [0.907] [0.964] [0.889] [1.201]
Log of Population 9.339*** 8.678*** 8.613*** 9.313*** 8.087*** 7.576***
[1.454] [1.494] [1.579] [1.579] [1.442] [1.681]
Openness × Log of Income -0.020* -0.009
[0.011] [0.013]
Openness × Institutional Quality -0.02 -0.003
[0.017] [0.020]
ToT Variability 0.289 0.054
[1.184] [1.157]
Openness × ToT Variability -0.014 -0.012
[0.017] [0.017]
Openness × Export Concentration 0.414*** 0.444***
 [0.074]  [0.081]
Time Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 973 859 859 859 859 765 859 765
Countries 128 112 112 112 112 111 112 111
R-squared 0.05 0.06 0.30 0.31 0.31 0.29 0.33 0.33
See notes to previous tables.
Table 5. Openness, Export Differentiation and Government Size (Fixed-Effects, I)
Dependent variable: Government Consumption (% of GDP).
Export Differentiation Proxy (z i
ra ) built on Rauch (1999).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Openness -0.029 -0.092** 0.095 -0.106*** -0.076* -0.299*** -0.173
[0.045] [0.040] [0.090] [0.041] [0.043] [0.056] [0.123]
Openness × z i
bw 0.362*** 0.421*** 0.509*** 0.473*** 0.413*** 0.669*** 0.750***
  [0.130]  [0.115]  [0.121]  [0.120]  [0.128]  [0.123]  [0.140]
Log of Income -2.650*** -1.245 -2.758*** -2.130** -2.039** -0.629
[0.891] [1.077] [0.893] [0.954] [0.885] [1.192]
Log of Population 9.028*** 8.130*** 8.066*** 8.929*** 7.739*** 6.668***
[1.452] [1.499] [1.590] [1.576] [1.451] [1.705]
Openness × Log of Income -0.026** -0.018
[0.011] [0.013]
Openness × Institutional Quality -0.026 -0.005
[0.017] [0.020]
ToT Variability 0.648 0.737
[1.184] [1.159]
Openness × ToT Variability -0.021 -0.024
[0.017] [0.017]
Openness × Export Concentration 0.356*** 0.382***
 [0.070]  [0.077]
Time Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 859 859 859 859 765 859 765
Countries 112 112 112 112 111 112 111
R-squared 0.06 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.29 0.33 0.33
See notes to previous tables.
Table 6. Openness, Export Differentiation and Government Size (Fixed-Effects, II)
Dependent variable: Government Consumption (% of GDP).
Export Differentiation Proxy (z i
bw ) built on Broda and Weinstein (2006). 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
GDP GDP pc rel GDP pc GDP pc GDP pc GDP pc rel GDP pc
Growth of Private GDP -0.322*** -0.320*** -0.327*** -0.263** -0.321*** -0.288*** -0.290**
  [0.123] [0.104] [0.113] [0.124] [0.101] [0.098] [0.111]
Observations 95 95 95 93 93 93 93
R-squared 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.15 0.12 0.13 0.12
Growth of Private GDP -0.389* -0.436*** -0.427*** -0.452***
[0.214] [0.136] [0.143] [0.154]
Growth of Av. Years of Schooling 0.099 0.060
[0.098] [0.101]
Growth of Gov. Share of GDP -0.031 -0.024
[0.122] [0.125]
Log of Av. Years of Schooling, 1960 -0.004
[0.003]
Log of Life Expectancy, 1962 0.000
[0.000]
R-squared 0.14 0.11 0.12 0.10
Log of Private GDP pc, 1960 -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.014*** -0.013***
[0.003] [0.003] [0.002] [0.002]
Log of Av. Years of Schooling, 1960 0.002 0.002 0.010** 0.007*
[0.002] [0.002] [0.004] [0.004]
Log of Life Expectancy, 1962 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Growth of Av. Years of Schooling 0.628*** 0.409**
[0.221] [0.196]
Growth of Gov. Share of GDP -0.297*** -0.272***
 [0.095]   [0.078]
Observations 93 93 93 93
R-squared 0.53 0.53 0.64 0.66
F-statistic of Excluded Instruments 36.1 33.6 32.1 36.1
P-value J-stat. Overidentifying Restr. 0.45 0.53 0.44
Table 7. IV and OLS Estimates of the Terms of Trade Externality
Cross-sectional OLS and Instrumental Variables estimates. The growth rate of non-fuel terms of trade is computed as the annual growth rate
of export prices minus the growth rate of import prices after netting out the change in fuel prices as in Backus and Crucini (2000). Private
GDP is real GDP net of government consumption; it is measured as total GDP in column (1), in per capita terms in columns (2) and (4)-(6),
and relative to trading partners in columns (3) and (7). Data sources: PWT 6.1, UN-Comtrade, Barro-Lee and World Bank.
OLS regressions for the growth rate of non-fuel terms of trade
IV regressions for the growth rate of non-fuel terms of trade (Two-Stage Least Squares)
First stage regressions for the growth rate of Private GDP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
GDP GDP pc rel GDP pc GDP pc GDP pc GDP pc rel GDP pc
Growth of Private GDP -0.475** -0.571*** -0.583*** -0.488** -0.571*** -0.492** -0.518***
[0.214] [0.169] [0.165] [0.228] [0.169] [0.195] [0.193]
Observations 47 47 47 47 47 47 47
R-squared 0.14 0.27 0.27 0.28 0.27 0.28 0.28
Growth of Private GDP -0.670 -0.673*** -0.641** -0.651**
[0.500] [0.214] [0.281] [0.284]
Growth of Av. Years of Schooling 0.021 -0.037
[0.143] [0.150]
Growth of Gov. Share of GDP 0.049 0.092
[0.179] [0.172]
F-statistic of Excluded instruments 9.8 25.8 15.6 16.4
P-value J-stat. Overidentifying Restr. 0.85 0.50 0.74
R-squared 0.27 0.26 0.27 0.27
Growth of Private GDP -0.221 -0.151 -0.128 -0.205 -0.151 -0.197 -0.190
[0.169] [0.129] [0.143] [0.182] [0.129] [0.125] [0.140]
Observations 48 48 48 46 46 46 46
R-squared 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.04
Growth of Private GDP 0.112 0.062 -0.088 -0.082
[0.517] [0.263] [0.227] [0.249]
Growth of Av. Years of Schooling -0.250 -0.255
[0.260] [0.257]
Growth of Gov. Share of GDP -0.055 -0.052
[0.185] [0.192]
F-statistic of Excluded Instruments 13.0 9.8 14.1 14.0
P-value J-stat. Overidentifying Restr. 0.99 0.39 0.40
R-squared 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.03
b) All other countries
OLS regressions for the growth rate of non-fuel terms of trade
IV regressions for the growth rate of non-fuel terms of trade (Two-Stage Least Squares)
See notes to Table 7.
Table 8. The Terms of Trade Externality Across Groups
a) Countries with a stronger positive association between openness and government size 
OLS regressions for the growth rate of non-fuel terms of trade
IV regressions for the growth rate of non-fuel terms of trade (Two-Stage Least Squares)
Government Import Total Import 
(% of Gov. Consumption) (% of GDP)
Brazil 1.07 10.75
Canada 0.03 45.20
Czech Republic 1.78 64.17
Denmark 0.00 38.84
Finland 1.64 39.16
Germany 0.80 32.03
Hungary 1.67 53.94
Indonesia 3.38 30.56
Ireland 3.66 93.82
Netherlands 0.11 63.05
Slovak Republic 0.22 73.09
Sweden 0.02 48.13
Switzerland 0.04 44.70
United Kingdom 0.10 28.62
Mean 1.04 47.58
Table A1. Home Bias in Government Consumption
Data source: OECD Input-Output Tables.
Country z i ra z i bw Country z i ra z i bw
Albania 76.97 33.30 Jordan 63.23 37.62
Algeria 0.52 15.99 Kazakhstan 4.63 17.41
Antigua 86.11 48.00 Kenya 22.40 28.17
Argentina 27.11 22.18 Korea 73.38 37.94
Armenia 19.81 39.75 Kyrgyzstan 17.07 42.23
Australia 24.35 28.17 Latvia 64.31 27.52
Austria 75.44 37.15 Lebanon 48.05 32.88
Azerbaijan 4.47 10.16 Lesotho 98.10 26.67
Bangladesh 89.01 36.38 Lithuania 51.41 25.66
Barbados 41.76 26.53 Macao 91.52 38.04
Belarus 61.39 28.27 Macedonia 48.60 28.02
Belgium 58.05 38.25 Madagascar 57.86 37.11
Belize 16.22 25.10 Malawi 8.68 22.31
Benin 6.37 12.06 Mali 4.31 46.13
Bolivia 18.37 28.92 Mauritius 76.99 32.98
Botswana 7.43 55.83 Mexico 76.70 35.62
Brazil 46.90 23.91 Morocco 56.69 35.17
Bulgaria 55.06 28.87 Mozambique 8.50 28.23
Burkina Faso 13.99 11.14 Namibia 29.46 42.90
Burundi 7.58 20.75 Nepal 87.67 34.86
Cambodia 94.74 37.86 Netherlands 61.83 31.19
Cameroon 15.93 14.86 New Zealand 32.10 26.27
Canada 65.23 31.93 Nicaragua 10.12 28.77
Cape Verde 92.55 23.77 Niger 27.57 20.37
Central African Rep. 12.38 49.24 Nigeria 0.17 5.95
Chile 17.17 25.94 Norway 21.65 15.65
China 79.86 40.49 Pakistan 60.96 36.62
Colombia 31.61 23.60 Panama 23.61 25.83
Comoros 11.25 22.90 Papua New Guinea 2.66 25.46
Costa Rica 50.22 36.22 Paraguay 17.91 22.03
Cote d'Ivoire 18.82 25.65 Peru 16.23 37.04
Cuba 4.67 9.90 Philippines 89.83 33.83
Cyprus 36.43 28.02 Poland 72.15 32.88
Czech Republic 74.52 38.90 Portugal 77.44 37.40
Denmark 67.16 32.37 Romania 71.84 31.42
Dominica 59.96 35.00 Russia 33.70 16.79
Ecuador 11.69 19.34 Senegal 17.63 28.42
Egypt 31.30 19.91 Slovak Republic 71.12 37.76
El Salvador 41.38 29.73 Slovenia 76.50 39.34
Estonia 70.38 32.76 South Africa 55.89 28.08
Ethiopia 27.43 25.92 Spain 70.29 38.25
Fiji 56.62 26.22 St. Kitts & Nevis 73.30 38.15
Finland 61.54 36.82 St. Lucia 22.83 19.17
France 70.67 36.60 Sweden 74.56 38.45
Gabon 1.62 8.99 Switzerland 73.59 40.42
Gambia 23.21 46.57 Syria 23.05 18.40
Germany 78.92 37.46 Tanzania 10.43 40.53
Ghana 12.53 47.36 Thailand 64.92 37.74
Greece 46.98 29.90 Togo 21.80 24.57
Grenada 60.71 42.45 Trinidad &Tobago 7.33 18.20
Guatemala 29.91 25.88 Tunisia 69.57 30.53
Guinea 15.02 42.87 Turkey 68.83 35.15
Honduras 17.63 30.61 USA 75.23 36.98
Hungary 81.37 34.44 Uganda 8.81 26.44
Iceland 19.78 27.49 Ukraine 26.71 24.94
India 50.11 40.68 United Kingdom 71.46 38.08
Indonesia 40.91 30.89 Uruguay 39.51 26.75
Iran 6.17 9.88 Venezuela 3.22 12.18
Ireland 64.16 35.37 Vietnam 43.55 25.55
Israel 52.28 51.69 Yemen 1.04 8.04
Italy 80.51 35.97 Zambia 21.84 24.87
Jamaica 17.75 34.72 Zimbabwe 22.24 24.49
Japan 85.40 43.40 Mean 42.80 30.22
Table A2. Proxies for 1/σ  for the Countries in the Sample  
